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REWORKING THE REVOLUTION:
TREASURY RULEMAKING &
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
David Berke*
ABSTRACT
How administrative law applies to tax rulemaking is an open and contested
question. The resolution of this question has high stakes for the U.S. tax system.
The paradigm is shifting away from so-called “tax exceptionalism”—where Treasury action is considered effectively exempt from the Administrative Procedure
Act (the “APA”) and related administrative law doctrines. This paradigm-shift is
salutary. However, currently prevailing anti-exceptionalist theory—an administrative framework for tax that is rapidly gaining credence within both the federal
judiciary and the legal academy—threatens to destabilize the U.S. tax system.
This formalistic approach to administrative law in tax rulemaking has the potential to invalidate a wide swath of existing Treasury regulations and to preclude
the timely promulgation of new tax rules.
This Article argues that these two existing theories of tax administration—
exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism—are inadequate, often for complementary reasons. This Article’s critique then supports its proposals for tax rulemaking
processes that comply with the APA, but in a workable manner that does not
upend established tax law. These proposals provide an intellectual and practical
middle ground between the exceptionalists and anti-exceptionalists.
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INTRODUCTION
There is an ongoing revolution in how administrative law applies to tax.
The paradigm for Treasury’s administrative function is shifting from socalled “tax exceptionalism”—where Treasury rulemaking, adjudication, and
other action are considered largely exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act1 (the “APA”) and related administrative law doctrines—to a more
traditional model of APA-compliant practice.2 This change is salutary.
However, this Article intervenes in this paradigm-shift to moderate the excesses of both the revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries, to ensure that
the outcome for U.S. tax administration is more American than French
Revolution.
The core problem that this Article addresses is twofold. First, the pathbreaking legal scholarship that fomented this administrative paradigmshift—chiefly the work of Professor Kristin Hickman3—has imported into
1.
See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521
(2012)).
2.
The Supreme Court effectively announced this shift with its Mayo Foundation decision. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011)
(“[W]e are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law
only. To the contrary, we have expressly ‘[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a
uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action.’ ” (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko,
527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999)); see sources cited infra note 37.
3.
E.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of)
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
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the tax law an overly formalistic interpretation of the APA and what it
requires. This formalistic APA interpretation has made the paradigm-shift
into a destabilizing force in tax administration, given that it threatens, for
instance, to invalidate a wide swath of Treasury Regulations4 and thus to
imperil the integrity of the tax system more broadly. Second, at the other
end of the spectrum, tax exceptionalism maintains scattered support. Certain scholars and commentators push against the paradigm-shift and advocate for some version of tax exceptionalism as the superior model.5 Their
arguments are unconvincing, and this pro-exceptionalism school contributes
to continued confusion and upheaval in tax administration, as opposed to a
smoother transition to APA compliance.
Professor Hickman and the holdout tax exceptionalists are on opposite
sides of the argument, but the issues that their scholarship and commentary
create are interconnected. Professor Hickman’s formalistic portrayal of the
APA has such potential to destabilize the tax law that people cling to tax
exceptionalism. Continued advocacy of tax exceptionalism distracts from
more dynamic discussion of how the APA applies to tax.
This Article critiques both viewpoints to solve their complementary
problems together. In the process, it sketches a vision of tax rulemaking that
complies with the APA, but in a workable manner that does not upend
established tax law. Specifically, this Article considers these viewpoints in
the context of Treasury rulemaking, which is a natural prism through which
to consider these administrative law issues.6 The general principles estabREV. 1727 (2007) [hereinafter Hickman, Coloring]; Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy:
Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153 (2008) [hereinafter Hickman, Responding].
4.
E.g., Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3, at 1795 (“[A] substantial percentage of the
projects studied present APA compliance issues that render the resulting Treasury regulations susceptible to legal challenge on procedural grounds.”); Erin McManus, Altera Decision
Casts Shadow over Proposed and Adopted Rules, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), No. 208, at 1-2 (Oct.
28, 2015) (quoting Professor Hickman: “After Altera, many final and temporary Treasury
regulations are likely to be susceptible to legal challenge under APA Section 706 and State
Farm.”).
5.
E.g., Stephanie Hunter McMahon, The Perfect Process Is the Enemy of the Good Tax:
Tax’s Exceptional Regulatory Process, 35 VA. TAX REV. 553 (2016); James M. Puckett, Structural
Tax Exceptionalism, 49 GA. L. REV. 1067 (2015).
6.
Indeed, most recent legal developments in tax administration have involved
rulemaking. Given rulemaking’s centrality both to tax law and to core administrative law
principles, rulemaking is a natural focus for this Article’s project. However, the general principles established in this Article can be applied across tax law. Moreover, it would take a full
book to address the administrative-law implications for all forms of Treasury action. Others
have examined the administrative law dimensions of other forms of Treasury action. See, e.g.,
Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax Code Interpretation, 2009 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 239 [hereinafter Hickman, IRB Guidance]; Steve R. Johnson, Reasoned Explanation and IRS Adjudication, 63 DUKE L.J. 1771 (2014).
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lished in this Article can also be applied to other domains of Treasury
action.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides the historical and theoretical background for Parts II & III, which apply that theory to ongoing
debates in tax administration.
Part I establishes first principles. Part I.A recounts the recent legal developments in tax administration that have triggered this paradigm-shift
from tax exceptionalism to APA compliance, and also considers the potentially destabilizing consequences of this shift, due to prevailing anti-exceptionalist theory. Part I.B provides background on general administrative law
principles and reviews the history and judicial interpretation of the APA.
This review demonstrates that, contrary to its portrayal by Professor Hickman,7 the APA is not a strict or “settled” template of procedural requirements. To the contrary, the APA’s statutory language is vague and opentextured by design. The APA is, as applied, at least as much judicial construction as statute.
With this APA argument established, Part II.A then turns to the remaining vestiges of tax exceptionalism. It demonstrates why tax exceptionalism is no longer an acceptable paradigm for tax administration. However,
Part II.B argues that, while tax exceptionalism has been rightfully overthrown per Part II.A, exceptionalism was the prevailing law of tax administration until the last decade or so. Tax exceptionalism was an era, not an
error. It is not that Treasury has been flagrantly violating the APA and only
recently called to account; Treasury’s exceptionalist practice was, in effect,
the law for quite some time. Part II.B demonstrates this historical argument
by reviewing the legal history of the interpretive exception to APA notice
and comment, as applied in tax rulemaking.8 Part II.B concludes that this
perspective on exceptionalism’s historical validity influences how courts and
administrators should manage and police Treasury’s transition to APA compliance moving forward.
These conclusions in Parts I and II feed into Part III, which analyzes
anti-exceptionalist administrative theory in the context of tax rulemaking.
First, Part III.A provides empirical context for anti-exceptionalist claims
that Treasury is egregiously non-compliant with the APA’s rulemaking requirement for pre-promulgation notice and comment—a claim that is foundational to the prevailing anti-exceptionalist arguments. However, this
7.
E.g., Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3, at 1795 (describing the APA as “fairly settled”); Kristin E. Hickman, Swallows Holding Ltd. v. Commissioner: Limited Progress in
Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Administrative Law, ENGAGE, June 2008, at 4, 4 (stating “many
of the governing rules and standards [of administrative law doctrines] are relatively settled”).
8.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012).
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context shows that, as an initial matter, the Treasury Department is about
average in terms of its empirical avoidance of APA notice and comment for
rulemaking.
Moving from empiricism to doctrine, Part III.B then examines the antiexceptionalist view of when Treasury is doctrinally required, under the
APA, to engage in pre-promulgation notice and comment. Specifically, Part
III.B examines debates over (i) Treasury’s application of the interpretive
and good cause exceptions to APA rulemaking and (ii) Treasury’s use of socalled “temporary regulations”9 to avoid pre-promulgation notice and comment. For the interpretive and good cause exceptions, Part III.B.1-2 argues
that current anti-exceptionalist scholarship imposes a formalist view of
these exceptions to notice and comment that is inaccurate. Through its analysis, this Article proposes middle-ground solutions that are APA-compliant,
but that avoid the destabilizing doctrinal conclusions of current anti-exceptionalist theory.10 For temporary regulations, while refraining from a conclusion, Part III.B.3 at least problematizes current statutory interpretation
that effectively eliminates temporary regulations as a means for Treasury to
avoid pre-promulgation notice and comment.
Part III.C then moves from exceptions to the substance of notice and
comment. It considers what the APA and the related State Farm doctrine11
require of tax rulemaking when Treasury undertakes notice and comment.
Part III.C then puts forward an understanding of what constitutes adequate
reason-giving for State Farm purposes in tax rulemaking. APA § 553 and
State Farm apply to tax law like any other field, but the nature of reasongiving within tax law is necessarily a contextual question that can often
produce a workable answer.
Two quick points of definition before this analysis begins. When this
Article refers to “tax administration,” it is referring to how administrative
law principles operate in U.S. tax law. “Tax administration” commonly refers to the day-to-day operation of the tax system,12 but this Article employs
the term in a much narrower sense. Second, the term “tax exceptionalism” is
also often used in a more general sense than is meant here, to refer to the
concept that tax is (administratively and otherwise) “fundamentally differ9.
I.R.C. § 7805(e) (2012).
10.
Professor Richard Murphy has gestured toward something similar to this argument
in preliminary terms. See Richard Murphy, Pragmatic Administrative Law and Tax Exceptionalism, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 21 (2014).
11.
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
12.
E.g., Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1129 (2015) (referring to “tax
administration” as the overall process of taxation and tax collecting).
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ent from other areas of law.”13 The term is also used to refer to certain anticompetitive14 aspects of U.S. international taxation.15 Neither of those
meanings is intended here.

I. BACKGROUND: L EGAL DEVELOPMENTS &

THE

APA

A. Tax Administration: The Revolution So Far
Before proceeding, it is necessary to recount what this Article has
termed a “revolution” in tax administration.16 The potentially destabilizing
consequences of this revolution are then considered.
Until the last decade or so, “generally applicable administrative law was
not applied to taxation under the doctrine of tax exceptionalism.”17 In
rulemaking, Treasury took the position that it was largely exempt from the
APA, including the statute’s required rulemaking procedures18 and the
APA’s more general requirement for contemporaneous reason-giving in
agency action.19 These positions were the opposite of the usual default in
13.
Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be Tax
Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 531 (1994).
14.
See John M. Samuels, American Tax Isolationism, 123 TAX NOTES 1593, 1593-94
(2009).
15.
E.g., ROSANNE ALTSHULER ET AL., TAX POL’Y CTR., L ESSONS THE UNITED STATES CAN L EARN
FROM OTHER COUNTRIES’ TERRITORIAL SYSTEMS FOR TAXING INCOME OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
33, 38 (2015), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/lessons-united-states-can-learnother-countries-territorial-systems-taxing-income/full.
16.
Cf. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973, 974 (7th Cir. 1998)
(“As one might expect in a case involving the interpretation of the tax code and its accompanying regulations, a certain amount of dry exposition is necessary to lay out the
controversy.”).
17.
Note, Administrative Law - Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1747, 1747 (2013) [hereinafter Judicial Review].
18.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). As Professor Hickman has documented, Treasury traditionally took the position that it was, in effect, mostly exempt from the APA’s notice-andcomment requirements, though it voluntarily chose to comply. Hickman, Coloring, supra note
3, at 1729 nn.8-10.
19.
As codified in the seminal State Farm case, the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious”
standard requires that, when an agency acts, they must “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal citations omitted); see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
By contrast, as of 2011, the “Internal Revenue Manual provision dealing with drafting regulations and preambles explicitly instruct[ed] IRS personnel that ‘it is not necessary to justify
the rules that are being proposed or adopted or alternatives that were considered.’ This
statement essentially instructs IRS employees to draft preambles in a way that violates the
arbitrary and capricious standard.” Patrick J. Smith, The APA’s Arbitrary and Capricious Standard and IRS Regulations, 136 TAX NOTES 271, 274 (2012) (quoting IRM 32.1.5.4.7.3(1) (Sept.
30, 2011)).
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administrative law—that the APA normally applies, subject to exceptions.
At the same time, APA-based challenges to tax rulemaking (and to other
Treasury actions, for that matter) were rare to non-existent.20 Tax was thus
a “special case”21 in administrative law that operated, for the most part, in its
own separate sphere of administrative practice.22
This tax exceptionalism also manifested itself in other administrative
law doctrines logically linked to the APA. Most prominently, in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court
established its doctrine of judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation.23 For nearly a quarter century after Chevron, commentators, courts24
and scholars debated whether Treasury’s statutory interpretations were subject to Chevron deference or to the preceding, tax-specific deference regime
of the National Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States.25 Until Mayo Foundation
for Medical Education & Research v. United States (discussed infra), tax exceptionalism in judicial deference prevailed as an empirical matter, for the
Court generally applied National Muffler to tax cases rather than Chevron.26
20.
See Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Tax Regulations, 44 TAX LAW. 343, 359 (1991) (“Few tax cases have considered whether the Treasury has
complied with APA requirements in its rulemaking.”); Hickman, IRB Guidance, supra note 6,
at 261, 271-72 (stating that “I know of no contemporary cases in which taxpayers have challenged the validity of IRB guidance for failing to satisfy APA procedural requirements for
legislative rules,” except for the Cohen case referenced infra note 39); Hickman, Coloring,
supra note 3, at 1764-65 (“[T]axpayers rarely challenge Treasury regulations on procedural
grounds . . . .”); Patrick J. Smith, Mannella, State Farm, and the Arbitrary and Capricious
Standard, 131 TAX NOTES 387, 390 (2011) (“State Farm and the arbitrary and capricious standard are rarely cited in tax cases . . . .”).
21.
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J.
1083, 1108 (2008) (“[T]he Court rarely applies Chevron to IRS interpretations. If a deference
regime is applied, it is usually the pre-Chevron regime associated with National Muffler Dealers v. United States.”).
22.
Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Tax as Everylaw: Interpretation, Enforcement, and the Legitimacy of the IRS, 69 TAX LAW. 493, 498-99 (2016).
23.
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
24.
Compare Snowa v. Comm’r, 123 F.3d 190, 197 (4th Cir. 1997) (accepting the National Muffler standard for certain Treasury regulations) with Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v.
United States, 142 F.3d 973, 983 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying Chevron, rather than National
Muffler, to tax regulations).
25.
Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979); see Kristin E.
Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L.
REV. 1537 (2006) [hereinafter Hickman, Mead] (arguing that Chevron deference should apply
in tax rather than National Muffler).
26.
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 21, at 1108-09 (“[T]he Court rarely applies Chevron to
IRS interpretations. If a deference regime is applied, it is usually the pre-Chevron regime
associated with National Muffler Dealers v. United States.”); Linda Galler et al., ABA Section of
Taxation Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 721 (2004) [hereinafter
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Initially, critiques of tax exceptionalism fomented in the academy.27 In
the mid-nineties, Professor Paul Caron published a wide-ranging article that
argued against the “myth that tax law is fundamentally different from other
areas of law.”28 On tax administration, Professor Caron admonished the tax
bar for “neglect[ing] insights learned in other administrative law areas.”29
Other challenges to various aspects of tax exceptionalism percolated in the
academic and professional literature,30 but they remained fairly inchoate.
Then, in a series of articles, Professor Hickman (almost singlehandedly) built anti-exceptionalism into a bona fide legal movement.31 Within a
few years, largely due to Professor Hickman’s academic work and courtoriented advocacy,32 tax exceptionalism was judicially moribund. It is hard
ABA Report] (“[I]t is uncertain whether Mead and Chevron will be the primary authorities
governing the tax law. In tax cases, the Supreme Court has relied instead on a separate line
of Supreme Court tax jurisprudence asking whether a tax regulation is reasonable.”).
27.
For some additional discussion of this scholarship, see Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just
A Little Bit Special, After All?, 63 DUKE L.J. 1897 (2014).
28.
Caron, supra note 13, at 531.
29.
Id. at 554.
30.
E.g., Asimow, supra note 20; Naftali Z. Dembitzer, Beyond the IRS Restructuring and
Reform Act of 1998: Perceived Abuses of the Treasury Department’s Rulemaking Authority, 52 TAX
LAW. 501, 508 (1999) (“As an administrative agency, the Service and the Treasury request
public comments from interested persons under the format prescribed by the Administrative
Procedure Act of 1946. Arguably, the Service has been delinquent in its duty.”); Juan J.
Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice and Comment Rulemaking Requirements Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN . L.J. 317, 341 (1989) (criticizing Treasury avoidance of
APA pre-promulgation notice-and-comment requirements through use of the “good cause”
exception); Toni Robinson, Retroactivity: The Case for Better Regulation of Federal Tax Regulators, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 773 (1987) (criticizing the application of APA to tax law); Thomas W.
Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention,
116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 570-75 (2002) (explaining idiosyncratic distinction between interpretative and legislative rules in tax law); Karla W. Simon, Constitutional Implications of the Tax
Legislative Process, 10 AM . J. TAX POL’Y 235, 237-39 (1992); Juan F. Vasquez, Jr. & Peter A.
Lowy, Challenging Temporary Treasury Regulations: An Analysis of the Administrative Procedure
Act, Legislative Reenactment Doctrine, Deference, and Invalidity, 3 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 248,
253 (2003) (“Even though this seemingly required use of the APA procedures seems inevitable, the Treasury’s use of two exceptions has all but obliterated the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures.”).
31.
See Kristin E. Hickman, Administrative Law’s Growing Influence on U.S. Tax Administration, 3 J. TAX ADMIN . 82 (2017); Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66
VAND. L. REV. 465 (2013) [hereinafter Hickman, Unpacking]; Kristin E. Hickman, AgencySpecific Precedents: Rational Ignorance or Deliberate Strategy?, 89 TEX. L. REV. 89 (2011); Kristin
E. Hickman, The Promise and the Reality of U.S. Tax Administration, in THE DELICATE BALANCE:
TAX, DISCRETION AND THE RULE OF LAW 39 (Chris Evans et al. eds., 2011); Hickman, IRB
Guidance, supra note 6; Hickman, Responding, supra note 3; Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3;
Hickman, Mead, supra note 25.
32.
E.g., Brief of Prof. Kristin E. Hickman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011) (No. 09-837),
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to overstate the impact and impressiveness of Professor Hickman’s achievement.33 While the legal academy has become more and more irrelevant to
the practical workings of the law,34 Professor Hickman represents a happy
exception.
To date, four key opinions have struck strong blows against tax exceptionalism. The first and foremost is the Mayo Foundation case, which expressly overruled the tax-specific deference regime of National Muffler.35
The deference regime for agency interpretations is inextricably linked to
issues of APA compliance and related administrative law doctrines.36 Thus,
as has been recognized,37 the Court’s decision to apply the trans-substantive
Chevron standard to tax likely represents a broader orientation against tax
exceptionalism. The Court expressly stated it was “not inclined to carve out
an approach to administrative review good for tax law only. To the contrary,
we have expressly ‘[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a uniform
approach to judicial review of administrative action.’ ”38 That statement
strongly portended the beginning of the end for tax exceptionalism.
That same year, an en banc D.C. Circuit opinion—Cohen v. United
States39—similarly conveyed an anti-exceptionalist bent. The case concerned
IRS refund procedures for certain erroneously collected excise taxes.40 The
2010 WL 3934618; Brief of Prof. Kristin E. Hickman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 08-5088, 085093, 08-5174), 2010 WL 5779109.
33.
See Ann Murphy, A Sea Change in Court Analysis of Treasury Regulations, 35 ABA TAX
TIMES 21, 21 (Feb. 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/taxation/publications/abatax
times_home/16feb/16feb-ac-murphy-a-sea-change-in-court-analysis-of-treasury-regulations
.html.
34.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY 12-13
(2016) (describing the “estrangement between the judiciary and the academy”).
35.
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011); see
Kelsey C. Mellette, Note, The Service and the APA in Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United
States: A Chance at Redefinition and Mandating Administrative Law Universality, 66 TAX LAW.
819, 831 (2013) (noting Mayo Foundation’s role in “[t]he movement toward[ ] universality
between the Treasury and the rest of administrative law”).
36.
See Hickman, Mead, supra note 25, at 1617-18.
37.
See, e.g., Amandeep S. Grewal, Foreword, Taking Administrative Law to Tax, 63
DUKE L.J. 1625, 1626 (2014) (“By so rejecting tax exceptionalism in the regulatory-deference
context, the Court may have brought general administrative-law doctrines to several areas of
tax administration . . . .”); Jeremiah Coder, Tax Law’s Vanity Mirror Shattered, 134 TAX NOTES
35, 35 (2012) (“[B]y and large the [tax] field assumed for decades that its unique set of issues
required specialized legal treatment when it came to . . . administrative procedures. That
notion was turned on its head when the Supreme Court decided [Mayo Foundation]”); Kristin
E. Hickman, Goodbye Tax Exceptionalism, ENGAGE, Nov. 2011, at 4, 4-5.
38.
Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 55 (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999)).
39.
Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
40.
Id. at 719-20.
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plaintiffs challenged the IRS Notice implementing the refund procedures as
procedurally invalid for failure to comply with the APA.41 Significantly, the
court strongly rejected the idea that tax receives special treatment under the
APA. As the court stated, “The IRS is not special . . . no exception exists
shielding it—unlike the rest of the Federal Government—from suit under
the APA.”42 In that passage, the court was specifically discussing the APA’s
sovereign immunity waiver,43 but the court’s sharp statement seems intended to carry far broader implications.
The next year in 2012, the Federal Circuit actualized Cohen’s implications in Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United States.44 In Dominion, the court
invalidated a Treasury Regulation under the APA’s State Farm standard for
administrative reason-giving.45 Treasury had viewed itself as effectively exempt from State Farm for quite some time,46 so Dominion represented a
dramatic rebuke of that exceptionalist position.
However, Dominion turned out to be not nearly as dramatic as Altera v.
Commissioner,47 a Tax Court opinion that is the most recent and most aggressively anti-exceptionalist of the four discussed here. The Altera opinion
reached two important conclusions of law. First, the court summarily dismissed the Treasury Department’s longstanding legal arguments for avoiding APA notice and comment, based on Treasury’s broad interpretations of
the interpretive and good cause exceptions (discussed in Part III.B.1-2 below).48 The court did not cite to Professor Hickman on these points, but its
reasoning matched hers. Second, building on Dominion, the Tax Court applied a stringent version of the APA’s State Farm standard.49 Specifically,
the court found that State Farm required Treasury to contemporaneously
justify the regulation at issue with complex and difficult-to-obtain empirical
analysis, rather than less technical reason-giving.50

41.
Id. at 721-22.
42.
Id. at 723.
43.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012).
44.
Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
45.
Id. at 1319. For good measure, the court also found the regulation substantively
invalid under Chevron, but its reasoning on that substantive invalidity is not relevant to this
Article. Id. at 1317-19.
46.
See sources cited supra notes 17-18.
47.
Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91 (2015), appeal argued, No. 16-70497 (9th Cir.
Oct. 11, 2017). The case is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
48.
See id. at 116-17.
49.
Id. at 120-31.
50.
Id. at 123-24.
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Particularly with that first conclusion, the Tax Court—the judicial body
that hears more than 95% of federal taxpayer litigation51—sent a strong antiexceptionalist message to Treasury. Indeed, the Altera opinion was seemingly crafted to emphasize that message. To this end, the full court reviewed
the opinion,52 and in a rare show of unanimity, all the judges who reviewed
the decision joined it, without a single concurrence or dissent.53 If Treasury
wants its regulations to be sustained in court, Altera seems to say, then
Treasury must abandon its exceptionalist administrative practices.54 In effect, the Tax Court directed Treasury to Professor Hickman’s vision of APA
compliance as the path forward.
This Article argues below that aspects of these opinions—in particular
Dominion and Altera, which strongly reflect prevailing anti-exceptionalist
theory—incorrectly conceive of how the APA operates.55 Because of these
flaws, the judicial paradigm-shift away from exceptionalism has the potential to impede tax rulemaking moving forward, for rulemaking will be subject to onerous procedural burden beyond what should be necessary under
the APA. And even greater destabilization from these anti-exceptionalist
judicial opinions—and, indeed, from prevailing anti-exceptionalist theory in
general, as applied to rulemaking—results from retrospective application.56
In the tax context, there is no overarching statute of limitations for a
claim that a tax regulation is invalid because the process of its promulgation
violated the APA.57 Because neither Professor Hickman nor the Dominion/
51.
L. Paige Marvel, The Evolution of Trial Practice in the United States Tax Court, 68 TAX
LAW. 289, 289, 292 (2015) (noting that the Tax Court is the “primary tax litigation forum for
federal tax disputes” and that it “adjudicates more than 95% of the tax cases filed by taxpayers
nationally and, for the fiscal year 2013, had approximately 71% of the total dollars in dispute
. . . in its inventory”).
52.
See I.R.C. § 7460(b) (2012) (authorizing Chief Judge of Tax Court to direct fullcourt view of an opinion); Mary Ann Cohen, How To Read Tax Court Opinions, 1 HOUS. BUS.
& TAX L.J. 1, 5-6 (2001) (noting full-court review is generally directed where a Treasury
Regulation is invalidated and/or “in cases of widespread application where the result may be
controversial”).
53.
Kristin Hickman, Altera Corp. & Subs. v. Comm’r: The Tax Court Delivers An
APA-Based Smackdown, TAXPROF BLOG (July 28, 2015, 3:01 PM), http://taxprof.typepad.com/
taxprof_blog/2015/07/hickman-altera-corp-subs-v-commissioner-the-tax-court-delivers-anapa-based-smackdown.html (“[T]he fact that the Tax Court unanimously backed such a thorough and unequivocal application of general administrative law principles in reviewing a
Treasury regulation is truly remarkable.”).
54.
Murphy, supra note 33 (“It seems clear that Altera is a bellwether of change for
Treasury. It can no longer rely on tax exceptionalism to support a relaxed administrative-law
standard.”).
55.
For the details of this argument, see infra Part III.B-C.
56.
See sources cited supra note 4.
57.
Within a given proceeding, a taxpayer is subject to statutes of limitations to contest
a tax liability. E.g., I.R.C. § 6511(a) (2012). One can also, of course, be barred from making
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Altera opinions apply their APA interpretations for tax on a purely forwardlooking basis,58 theoretically, any regulation ever promulgated in accordance
with exceptionalist practice is at risk of invalidation. Indeed, Professor
Hickman has argued that approximately 41% of the regulations promulgated
over a recent three-year period could be found procedurally invalid under
the APA.59 This risk of widespread invalidation could potentially wreak
havoc on the tax system.60 At the same time, as the cases in this Part show,
APA-based challenges to tax regulations are ramping up,61 and it may be
becoming easier, as a matter of procedure in tax litigation, to bring APAbased challenges to tax regulations.62

B. The APA: Doctrine & Theory
As described in Part I.A, courts have chiefly acted in the negative, telling Treasury how its prior administrative practice is no longer acceptable.
The obvious next question is what the positive vision is. What are the details of the administrative law doctrines with which Treasury has failed to
comply? To provide that positive vision, Part I.B.1 provides basic doctrinal
background on the APA. With those basics established, Part I.B.2 provides
a theoretical understanding of how the APA’s open-textured statutory language facilitates judicial oversight of the administrative state. As previously
noted, recent tax scholarship presents an overly formalistic interpretation of
the APA and what it requires. Part I.B.2 counters that portrayal, and when
the APA is properly understood as an only somewhat-bounded vehicle for
judicial policy monitoring (rather than a statute subject to settled, textualist
interpretation), that necessarily undercuts any claim to authoritative or absolute interpretation of the APA’s provisions in the context of tax
administration.
an APA-based claim in an individual proceeding if the claim is not timely raised. See In re
Long-Distance Tel. Serv. Fed. Excise Tax Refund Litig., 901 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5-7 (D.D.C.
2012), aff’d, 751 F.3d 629 (D.C. Cir. 2014). However, no statute provides a global time limit
to contest the administrative validity of a tax rule, as is the case in some non-tax contexts. See
Ronald M. Levin, Statutory Time Limits on Judicial Review of Rules: Verkuil Revisited, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2203 (2011).
58.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4.
59.
Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3, at 1749 tbl.1. For additional context for this empirical claim, see infra Part III.A.
60.
The same is true for other aspects of prevailing anti-exceptionalist theory that are
beyond the scope of this Article. For instance, an invalidation of all penalties associated with
sub-regulatory guidance. See Hickman, IRB Guidance, supra note 6.
61.
See, e.g., Patrick J. Smith, Challenges to Tax Regulations: The APA and the Anti-Injunction Act, 147 TAX NOTES 915 (2015).
62.
See Chamber of Commerce v. IRS, No. 1:16-CV-944-LY, 2017 WL 4682050, at *34 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2017), notice of appeal filed, (5th Cir. Nov. 27, 2017).
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1. Doctrine: APA Basics
The APA63 was passed in 1946 as “a new, basic and comprehensive
regulation of [agency] procedures.”64 The APA provides certain “general law
about administrative procedure and control” that applies trans-substantively
to the actions of federal agencies, in addition to any requirements in
agency-specific statutes.65 Whenever an agency acts, it must meet the applicable procedural standards that the APA imposes.
The APA provides two broad sets of interrelated procedural controls.
The first, more diffuse control is the requirement for reasoned administration.66 In what is commonly referred to as State Farm review,67 courts can
“set[ ] aside” agency action as “ ‘arbitrary’ or ‘capricious’ ”68 under the APA
because the agency failed to “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action[,] including a rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made.”69 In other words, to avoid judicial invalidation, agency actions must be, in a broad sense, reasoned and reasonable. The agency must
provide cognizable70 and contemporaneous71 reasons for its action. Certain
types of agency action (and inaction) are excluded from this judicial reasonableness review,72 but as elaborated in case law, agency action is presump63.
Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2012)).
64.
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 523
(1978) (quoting Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 70 (1950)).
65.
CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2:30 (2016).
66.
See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015) (describing requirement
for “reasoned decisionmaking” (quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522
U.S. 359, 374 (1998))); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1679-80 (1975) (describing the concept of “requir[ing]” an agency “to
articulate the reasons for reaching a choice in a given case even though the loose texture of
its legislative directive allowed a range of possible choices”).
67.
After the seminal Supreme Court case that has come to exemplify this reasonableness review. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983).
68.
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009) (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A)).
69.
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (internal citation omitted).
70.
Agencies can only cite types of reasons that they are permitted to consider under
the statute or statutes authorizing their action. See, e.g., D.C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe,
459 F.2d 1231, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (invalidating agency action because the agency made its
decision based on impermissible political reasoning).
71.
See SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 92-95 (1943).
72.
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)-(2); e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (finding
agency prosecutorial discretion is presumptively unreviewable); Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 61-67 (2004) (finding agency discretion as to broad, programmatic
policy choices to be generally unreviewable under the APA).
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tively reviewable by courts.73 By contrast, as noted above, Treasury
historically took the position that it is effectively exempt from this State
Farm review,74 at least in the rulemaking context,75 even where none of the
established exceptions to that review apply.
For its second set of procedural controls, the APA imposes more specific procedural requirements on given types of agency action. To establish
the minimum procedures required for a given agency action, the APA “divides the universe of administrative action into two general decision-making
categories, rulemaking and adjudication.”76 Different sets of procedural requirements apply to each category. The APA provides only unhelpful, circular definitions for the terms “rulemaking” and “adjudication.”77 However,
the Supreme Court has differentiated rulemaking and adjudication for APA
purposes based on the “recognized distinction in administrative law between
proceedings for the purpose of promulgating policy-type rules or standards
[i.e., rulemaking], on the one hand, and proceedings designed to adjudicate
disputed facts in particular cases on the other [i.e., adjudication].”78
Processes that promulgate standards of broader applicability are rules;
processes that apply law to an individual or small group based on particularized facts are adjudications.
Agency actions are also differentiated based on whether they were created by formal or informal processes.79 A formal process is subject to more
procedural requirements than an informal one. Thus, the APA taxonomy of
agency actions can be conceived of as a 2-by-2 grid, with rulemaking and
73.
See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971); Lincoln
v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 190 (1993) (“[W]e have read the APA as embodying a basic presumption of judicial review.” (internal citation omitted)). But see Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 192 (finding
agency decision regarding an appropriation unreviewable under the APA); Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592, 599-601 (1988) (finding an agency action unreviewable under the APA).
74.
See sources cited supra note 19 and accompanying text.
75.
See IRM 32.1.5.4.7.3(1) (Sept. 30, 2011).
76.
Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189,
1265 (1986).
77.
A “rule making” is defined as an “agency process for formulating, amending, or
repealing a rule.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(5). Adjudication “means [the] agency process for the formulation of an order,” with an order defined as “the . . . final disposition . . . in a matter other
than rule making.” Id. § 551(7), (10).
78.
United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 245 (1973). The court cited
to the two iconic Supreme Court cases that illustrate this difference for purposes of the 14th
Amendment. Id. at 244-45. Compare Londoner v. City & Cty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386
(1908) (finding an adjudicatory-type hearing procedure is constitutionally necessary for a
property tax assessment on a small group of individuals) with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (concluding, for a property tax assessment
applicable to a far larger group, that no adjudicatory-type hearing procedure is necessary for
“a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people”).
79.
See KOCH, supra note 65, § 2:33.
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adjudication on one axis and formal and informal on the other. The APA’s
formal and informal adjudication requirements are less relevant to tax law,
given that tax-specific legislation has largely displaced APA adjudicatory
procedures.80
Rulemaking, however, is central to the tax exceptionalism debate. The
APA’s trial-like formal rulemaking procedures apply if a rule must be made,
according to the authorizing statute, “on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing.”81 These formal procedures are debilitating.82 It is thus
fairly rare to require formal rulemaking,83 and when formal procedures are
required, they are death by process.84
That leaves the “most important idea”85 in the APA: informal rulemaking, which constitutes most agency rulemaking (and, I believe, all tax
rulemaking). Under informal rulemaking, the agency must provide pre-promulgation notice in the Federal Register of its proposed rulemaking, including “the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved.”86 Interested parties are then allowed to respond with “data, views, or arguments” to the proposed rule.87 After “consideration of the relevant matter presented,” the agency then publishes the
final rule, along with “a concise general statement of [its] . . . basis and
purpose.”88 Courts can then review the agency’s decision-making process
under the same “arbitrary [or] capricious” standard for general reasonableness review.89 Reviewing courts can vacate or otherwise remand a rule for
failure to comply with these APA requirements.90
80.
See infra Part II.A.1. Per the Introduction, this Article mostly discusses rulemaking
and not adjudication.
81.
Id. § 553(c). The authorizing statute must either expressly cross-reference to the
APA’s formal procedure sections or use those exact words to institute formal rulemaking
requirements. See Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. at 236-38.
82.
See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.1 (2010).
83.
Id. § 7.1 (“[F]ormal rulemaking procedure simply does not work.”); Antonin Scalia,
Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP . CT. REV. 345,
347 (“The formal rulemaking provisions have in fact been applied to very few programs of
general rulemaking, where they have had predictably inefficient results.”).
84.
E.g., PIERCE, supra note 82, § 7.2; Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinventing Government and
Regulatory Reform: Studies in the Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. PITT. L. REV.
405, 416 (1996).
85.
Walter Gellhorn & Kenneth Culp Davis, Present at the Creation: Regulatory Reform
Before 1946, 38 ADMIN . L. REV. 507, 520 (1986).
86.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (2012).
87.
Id. § 553(c).
88.
Id.
89.
Id. § 706(2)(A).
90.
Id. § 706(2)(D).
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These informal rulemaking requirements are subject to several exceptions—types of rules (and other guidance) that the APA does not require to
be subjected to this pre-promulgation notice and comment.91 For tax administration, the two key exceptions are: (1) for “interpretative rules”92 and (2)
for rulemakings where the agency has “good cause”93 to skip notice and
comment. Until recently, Treasury took the position that virtually all of its
rulemakings qualified for one or both of these exceptions, with the result
that compliance with the APA’s informal rulemaking procedures was essentially voluntary for Treasury.94

2. Theory: The APA & Judge-Made Law
State Farm review and informal rulemaking requirements seem simple
on their face. Indeed, they derive from just a few plain words in the APA.
However, these statutory minima have become the foundation for a complex and exacting law of administrative action. This law is, to a substantial
degree, judge-made, and its contours and application are often a matter of
judicial decision.95 Judges themselves will rarely concede that their branch
has, in many ways, created law under the APA, but the APA’s requirements
are so “vague” that they “have been left to be elaborated almost exclusively
by judicial interpretation.”96 Indeed, as applied, the APA is at least as much
judicial construction as statute.97 That judicial construction is dynamic; it
varies widely across (and within) time and jurisdictions. Accordingly, one
cannot conceive of the APA as a formal checklist for agency actions. As a
purposefully vague statute, its application has necessarily been varied and
contextual.
91.
Id. § 553(a)(1)-(2), (b)(A)-(B).
92.
Id. § 553(b)(A).
93.
Id. § 553(b)(B).
94.
See sources cited supra note 18.
95.
See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 856, 901 (2007) (arguing that core aspect of administrative requirements that
allegedly derive from the APA are judicial constructions); Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of
Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, 55 TUL. L. REV. 418, 419 (1981) (advocating that the Supreme Court clarify that the APA’s statutory standard of review to establish
the statutorily prescribed “primacy of agency control over the rulemaking process,” in contrast to contrary judicial practice).
96.
See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 84, at 417.
97.
See Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive
Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 253 (1986) (“[T]he APA is more like a constitution than a statute. It
provides for flexibility in decision-making; it can be changed through interpretation without
the need for amendment; its movements are more pendulum-like than linear.”).
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One can see how much of modern APA practice is judge-made98 by
simply charting the APA through time. In the wake of the APA’s enactment, courts initially took a low-touch, deferential approach in their review
of agency action, both for informal rulemaking and general arbitrary and
capricious review.99 This approach accorded with the language of the statute itself.
Take informal rulemaking. In promulgating a final rule under informal
procedures, an agency must provide “a concise general statement of . . . basis
and purpose.”100 As then-Professor Antonin Scalia wrote, “[t]here is no
doubt that the burden meant to be imposed by this provision was minimal.”101 Indeed, the plain text indicates as much. The required “statement”
is supposed to be merely “concise” and “general.”102 The 1947 Attorney
General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act103 breezily describes
the required “statement”: “[F]indings of fact and conclusions of law are not
necessary. Nor is there required an elaborate analysis of the rules or of the
considerations upon which the rules were issued.”104 Not only were these
procedural requirements simple, but also judicial review under the “arbitrary” and “capricious”105 standard—the basis for reasonableness review of
both informal rulemaking and agency action generally—was highly deferen98.
See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration 70 (2017) (on file with author)
(“[C]ase law determines much of the scope and content of reason-giving and reasonableness
in American administrative law. Here, statutory interpretation is difficult to distinguish from
federal common law.”); PETER CANE, CONTROLLING ADMINISTRATIVE POWER: AN HISTORICAL COM PARISON 182, 515 (2016); Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (2012) (“Twenty-five years ago, Professor Cass Sunstein remarked
that ‘[m]uch of administrative law is common law,’ and the same remains true today. Numerous administrative law doctrines are judicially created at their core.” (quoting Cass R.
Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271, 271
(1986))). Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 485 (2010) (“Although some administrative law requirements are
plainly constitutionally required and others clearly rooted only in statutory or regulatory
enactments, a number of basic doctrines occupy a middle ground.”).
99.
Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 456 (1986) (describing how courts took “a position of doing almost nothing in the forties and fifties” vis-à-vis
APA review).
100.
5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (emphasis added).
101.
Scalia, supra note 83, at 378.
102.
5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
103.
See Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 63 (2004) (noting that the
1947 AG’s manual is “a document whose reasoning we [the Supreme Court] have often found
persuasive”).
104.
Scalia, supra note 83, at 379 (quoting ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINIS TRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 32 (1947)).
105.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
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tial.106 Again, that deference accords with the plain meaning of those two
words. As Professor Martin Shapiro colorfully described it, an action was
judicially determined to be arbitrary or capricious if the agency “had acted
like a lunatic.”107
How much has changed. Beginning in the sixties and seventies, courts
remade informal rulemaking—“invent[ing] a host of procedural requirements that turned rulemaking into a multiparty paper trial”108 thereby
“transform[ing] . . . simple, efficient notice and comment . . . into an extraordinarily lengthy, complicated, and expensive process.”109 Courts have
likewise supercharged arbitrary and capricious review generally into “a thorough, probing, in-depth review,”110 commonly known in the rulemaking
context as State Farm review.111 Nominally, the Supreme Court has precluded courts from mandating procedures that the APA does not itself require,112 but this claim of textual fidelity to the APA is widely regarded as
risible.113
Thus, when it comes to informal rulemaking requirements and State
Farm review, the APA is not some technical statutory template that can be
disinterestedly applied. It is true that the APA has often been presented as
such. Ever since the APA’s enactment, various stakeholders have attempted
106.
Morrison, supra note 97, at 263 (“For many years, scholars and litigants had believed that almost any agency action would satisfy the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard,
just as any statute examined under the equal protection rational basis test would survive.”);
see also Shapiro, supra note 99, at 453 (“Under the APA rulemaking generated no record to be
reviewed, and the standard of review made an agency’s decisions irreversible unless it had
acted insanely.”).
107.
Shapiro, supra note 99, at 454.
108.
Id. at 462; see, e.g., Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 333-35
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
109.
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN . L. REV.
59, 65 (1995) [hereinafter Pierce, Deossify]; Murphy, supra note 10, at 24 (“Courts have essentially rewritten the APA’s notice-and-comment provisions, transforming them from an easy
and straightforward mechanism in 1946 into their current monstrous form.”).
110.
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971); see Shapiro,
supra note 99, at 462 (describing how courts “converted the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ test
specified by the APA as the standard of judicial review of rulemaking from a lunacy test into
the ‘clear error’ standard that empowers a court to quash a rule not only when it is crazy but
also when the judges simply believe it is wrong”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Which Institution
Should Determine Whether an Agency’s Explanation of A Tax Decision Is Adequate?: A Response to
Steve Johnson, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1, 5-12 (2014) [hereinafter Pierce, Which Institution].
111.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
112.
See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015); Vt. Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978).
113.
E.g., Scalia, supra note 83, at 395 (“[I]t would seem that Vermont Yankee’s demand
for fealty to the APA must be taken with a grain of salt.”).
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to present the APA as “an administrative code . . . based on scientific principles”114 or as a “formula upon which opposing social and political forces have
come to rest.”115 Indeed, the “traditional depiction” of the APA is as “a product of reasoned deliberation by a handful of wise lawyers and legal academics.”116 As has been pointed out,117 this portrayal of the APA as reasoned,
technocratic, and apolitical serves to bolster its legitimacy (and thus, the
legitimacy of the administrative state that it regulates). In truth, the APA
was “an unprincipled jumble of political compromises” when passed,118 and
the consequent statutory vagueness has often allowed courts to construct a
law of administrative procedure.
Nothing is necessarily wrong with this reality of judicial policymaking.
Given the growth and perpetual evolution of the administrative state, it
may be that courts require certain broad, common law-type flexibility to
monitor agencies. At the same time, public admission that this judicial control of administration is often nakedly extra-statutory would, perhaps, undermine that control. Given broad delegations of power commonly granted
to administrative agencies119 and the toothlessness of the non-delegation
doctrine,120 plain-text (and thus narrow) interpretation of the APA could
arguably cede too much unaccountable control to administrators, relative to
courts. In any event, this Part’s historically informed, substantive account of
the APA shapes how one conceives of the APA on a policy level. Indeed, we
will see this throughout this Article as it discusses more specific APA provisions below.

II. AGAINST TAX EXCEPTIONALISM
With that background in Part I established, we can turn to the remaining case for tax exceptionalism. In discussing ongoing advocacy for exceptionalism, this Part does two things. First, Part II.A explains why continued
advocacy for tax exceptionalism is misguided. To this end, it primarily re114.
George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges
from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1668 (1996).
115.
Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 523 (emphasis added) (quoting Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950)).
116.
PIERCE, supra note 82, § 1.4.
117.
Shepherd, supra note 114, at 1668-69.
118.
Id. That is not to say the APA’s statutory framework is arbitrary or incoherent. In
many ways, the APA was a “best practices” document with built-in exceptions to take account
of the heterogeneity of practice that the Attorney General’s Report described in its background cases studies.
119.
Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 82 (1985) (“[A]rguments for broad delegations of authority to administrators are almost as continuous and ubiquitous as the statutes that they would justify.”).
120.
See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
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sponds to archetypal arguments from two pro-exceptionalism articles. Second, Part II.B argues that, while tax exceptionalism is no longer viable, it
was the prevailing law of tax administration for a long time. To prove this
point, this Part briefly examines the legal history of exceptionalist treatment
of the interpretive rule exception to APA notice and comment.121 Part II.B
concludes with the present relevance of this history: this perspective on
exceptionalism’s past influences how Treasury should transition to APA
compliance moving forward (as well as how courts should manage and police this transition).

A. Refutation of Pro-Exceptionalist Arguments
In responding to the pro-exceptionalism school, it is helpful to start
with an overarching point. This Article’s issue with the remaining tax exceptionalists could be viewed as more strategic than anything else. The legal
world has turned against tax exceptionalism. Legal developments to date
make that exceedingly clear, and this trend will accelerate moving forward.
It will accelerate because, while these tax administration issues are not inherently political, anti-exceptionalism has two major political advantages:
ideologically speaking, it has support that is both broad-based and partisan.
Support is broad-based in that an ideologically diverse range of judges and
justices has signed on to various aspects of the anti-exceptionalist project.122
Support is also partisan, both for conservatives and liberals. On the conservative front, anti-exceptionalism dovetails with conservative concern over
IRS overreach,123 as well as a more general conservative sympathy for administrative standards that increase required procedures and narrow agency
power.124 Given the Republicans’ 2016 electoral success, we can expect a
push to actualize these anti-exceptionalist principles, both in the judiciary
and the federal tax bureaucracy. One would also expect a liberal embrace of
anti-exceptionalism insofar as it facilitates challenges to the Trump Treasury, especially as it withdraws Obama-era regulations.125
121.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012).
122.
See supra Part I.A.
123.
See A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America, SPEAKER.GOV 10 (June 24, 2016),
https://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-PolicyPaper.pdf (“Over the past
three decades, the IRS has become a prime example of executive branch overreach, blatant
misconduct, and government waste.”).
124.
E.g., Regulatory Accountability Act of 2015, H.R. 185, 114th Cong. (2015), https://
www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr185/BILLS-114hr185rfs.pdf.
125.
Andy Grewal, Trump’s Broad Powers To Revoke Tax Regulations Issued by the Obama
Administration, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Nov. 14, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/
trumps-broad-powers-to-revoke-tax-regulations-issued-by-the-obama-administration/.
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All this is to say, in terms of real-world influence on tax administration,
to speak for tax exceptionalism is to lose. As is elaborated upon below,126 tax
exceptionalism was valid in its own time, but that time has passed. To be
anything but irrelevant in these tax administration debates, one needs to
reason within the APA and associated general principles of administrative
law, rather than rebel against them. Much can be accomplished through
such argument, given the APA is naturally dynamic and unsettled.127 The
way to win the debate is to argue about what the APA means to tax administration within the idiom of the APA—going through the APA provision by
provision, administrative law concept by concept—and without resorting to
the bygone notion of exceptionalism.
With that in mind, we can turn to the arguments still put forward for
exceptionalism. These arguments can be sorted into three groups: (i) structural argument about the IRS and its processes, discussed in Part II.A.1, (ii)
argument that anti-exceptionalists misinterpret the APA, discussed in Part
II.A.2, and (iii) argument about the APA’s normative value, discussed in
Part II.A.3.128

1. Structural Argument
The first argument is that Treasury needs special treatment as an administrative law matter because tax collection is a uniquely massive and
complex undertaking. Professor Stephanie McMahon argues that “the wide
reach of the federal tax system”—“over 240 million federal tax returns” filed
and “1.4 million returns . . . audited” in 2014—makes tax “unique.”129 As she
argues, “More people interact with the tax system than with any other part
of the federal government.”130 Her claim is that the tax collection system,
given its relative immensity, needs special administrative treatment.
In this view, the IRS not only faces the singularly massive task of tax
collection, but also faces it without the necessary political support from the
executive or legislature.131 Treasury is “forced to do much with little,” but
has still managed to maintain a workable, respected system for rulemaking
and guidance.132 Increased administrative law requirements are untenable,
126.
See infra Part II.B.
127.
See infra Parts I.B, III.
128.
While this Article overall is focused on tax rulemaking, these exceptionalism arguments (and their refutation) are mostly made at a more general, theoretical level. That is
simply the nature of these exceptionalist arguments, but once they are dismissed, this Article
naturally transitions to more rulemaking-targeted analysis.
129.
McMahon, supra note 5, at 555.
130.
Id.
131.
Id. at 556.
132.
Id. at 556-57.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\7-2\MEA204.txt

374

unknown

Seq: 22

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

26-APR-18

11:10

[Vol. 7:2

given the scope of Treasury’s duties and the resource constraints that it
faces.
The tax system is also as dense as it is broad, and “[t]he sheer complexity of the law requires administrative flexibility,”133 i.e., exceptionalism. As
this argument goes, Treasury must be excused from APA compliance to
cope with the challenges of this complexity. And not only that—tax practitioners also need exceptionalism for the same reason. Full APA compliance
“would demand (1) the continued understanding of tax specific rules . . .
plus (2) a newfound understanding of how those rules interact with other
areas of the law.”134 This required scope of knowledge is too much for private practitioners to bear, given “[f]ew, perhaps many fewer, attorneys and
advisors could hope to attain a working level of information” in this APAcompliant world.135
These arguments are unavailing. To take these points in turn, tax collection is certainly a herculean endeavor in scale and complexity, and the
political challenges of adequate IRS funding are painfully real.136 However,
the federal government runs all sorts of colossal programs subject to scarce
(and politically fraught) funding. Professor McMahon compares, among
other things, the number of military personnel to the annual number of tax
returns to demonstrate that, given the latter number vastly exceeds the former, the scale of tax collection is far grander than that of the armed
forces.137 But it is sophistic to compare 1040s with riflemen. The relative
size of these numbers is meaningless, because the numbers mean qualitatively different things. To provide translatable figures, in fiscal year 2015,
federal spending on the IRS was around $11 billion;138 the defense budget
was $582 billion,139 almost 53 times bigger. The defense budget faces,
among other things, the challenges of sequester,140 just as IRS funding faces
its own political obstacles.
133.
Id. at 604.
134.
Id. at 611.
135.
Id.
136.
E.g., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS: VOL. I 33-35 (2013), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-Annual-Report/down
loads/Volume-1.pdf.
137.
McMahon, supra note 5, at 555.
138.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PROGRAM SUMMARY BY APPROPRIATIONS ACCOUNT AND BUDGET
ACTIVITY 2 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/IRS%20Budget%20in%20Brief%20FY
%202016.pdf.
139.
CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE FEDERAL BUDGET IN 2015 (2016), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/graphic/51110-budget1overall.pdf.
140.
LYNN M. WILLIAMS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44039, THE BUDGET CONTROL ACT AND
THE DEFENSE BUDGET: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
R44039.pdf.
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More importantly, these issues of scale and complexity do not logically
support blanket elimination of administrative restraint through tax exceptionalism. Indeed, one can just as easily argue that the federal tax system
should be administratively restrained precisely because it is so dense and pervasive. In that vein, scholars argue for greater administrative restraint in the
defense context.141 Moreover, if tax law is so impossibly complex, then all
the more reason to impose State Farm-type reason-giving requirements.
One can quite sensibly argue that such reason-giving helps practitioners
better understand and rationalize complex IRS actions—like handrails on
the M.C. Escher staircases of the tax law. Indeed, that counterclaim is far
more plausible than the assertion that tax practitioners lack the intellectual
capacity to simultaneously comprehend both tax and administrative law.
More faith should be had in the mind of the tax lawyer. Other species of
attorney certainly rise to this challenge. Environmental lawyers have to navigate both administrative law and the scientific and engineering complexity
of EPA regulation.142 How is their job description any less demanding than
that of the tax practitioner?
Then there is the APA itself. Judge-made though its law may often be,
the APA statutorily exempts certain subject matter from its rulemaking requirements.143 If tax were meant to be administratively exceptional as a
subject area because it is so massive and complex, it would have one of those
statutory exemptions. It does not.144 Beyond the APA’s text, Congress has
elsewhere statutorily given administrators authority to exempt actions from
APA compliance,145 but has not done so for the IRS.
Professor James Puckett makes a second structural argument for exceptionalism.146 His argument is structural in a more concrete sense. He argues
that tax is exceptional because tax rulemaking and adjudication statutorily
141.
E.g., ADMIN . CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 73-5: ELIMINATION OF THE
“MILITARY OR FOREIGN AFFAIRS FUNCTION” EXEMPTION FROM APA RULEMAKING REQUIREMENTS
(1973), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/73-5.pdf.
142.
E.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2714-26 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(describing an exhaustively technical EPA rulemaking process). The scientific complexity of
EPA regulation, in contrast to much IRS rulemaking, is discussed infra in terms of what State
Farm should and shouldn’t require in the tax context. See infra Part III.C.
143.
5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2012).
144.
Interestingly given Professor McMahon’s military comparison, the APA does exempt “military or foreign affairs” from informal rulemaking requirements. Id. § 553(a)(1).
145.
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B, § 102, 119 Stat. 231, 306
(authorizing the Secretary of Homeland Security to waive compliance with legal requirements, including the APA, for certain border security actions); Defs. of Wildlife v. Chertoff,
527 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2007) (upholding that authority).
146.
Puckett, supra note 5, at 1090-1108.
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vary from the APA in material ways.147 The variance in tax rulemaking is
discussed infra,148 so in responding to Professor Puckett, this Part will focus
on adjudication.
Professor Puckett notes, quite rightly, that “[t]he adjudication of tax
controversies is . . . very specialized.”149 Unlike the APA adjudication template, which contemplates in-agency adjudication,150 tax controversies are
adjudicated in the first instance either in the federal trial courts or Tax
Court.151 The differences from the APA template multiply from there, often
shifting procedural power from the IRS to the taxpayer. For instance, these
courts adjudicate factual issues de novo152 (unlike the APA’s deferential “substantial evidence” review of agency factual findings),153 and these courts are
less likely than regular APA tribunals to remand to the IRS for better reason-giving (and instead more likely to definitively decide legal issues
against the IRS).154 Professor Puckett argues that this tax-specific adjudicatory structure155 both serves important policy ends156 and illustrates that,
definitionally, tax administration is different from administrative law generally.157 In his view, exceptionalism lives in that difference.
But in administrative law, such difference is normal rather than exceptional. Particularly on the adjudicatory front, statutes frequently deviate
from the APA template. Beyond the specific alterations that they make,
these deviations are irrelevant to the applicability of general administrative
147.
Id. at 1091 (discussing how his article “contrasts the modalities of tax administration
with the APA template, pointing out that a striking degree of tax exceptionalism exists in
terms of the structure of available modalities”).
148.
See infra Part III.B.3.
149.
Puckett, supra note 5, at 1107.
150.
5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556(b), 3105 (2012).
151.
See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE L OKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND
GIFTS ¶ 115.1 (2017) (“When the IRS determines a deficiency, the taxpayer can litigate the
matter in any one of three courts: the Tax Court, a federal district court, or the Claims
Court.”). Taxpayers end up in court to the extent that the IRS’ dispute resolution processes
fail to lead to a resolution.
152.
Puckett, supra note 5, at 1107-08.
153.
See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
154.
Puckett, supra note 5, at 1108.
155.
As well as agency-specific quirks of tax rulemaking.
156.
Id. at 1108-18.
157.
Id. at 1118 (“Undertaking a comparative historical and structural analysis of tax
administration side by side with typical agency administration, one important contribution
of this Article is to clarify that applying Mayo’s mandate to apply a ‘uniform’ approach
carries a very thin, residual effect. That is because the structure of tax administration—in
terms of rulemaking and adjudication—is so exceptional.”).
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law principles.158 For instance, it is true that the APA contemplates inagency adjudication of administrative disputes.159 Indeed, the APA embodied an express rejection of the so-called split-enforcement model for administrative controversy,160 which vests prosecutorial discretion in one agency
and judicial authority in a separate agency or judicial body. Instead, the
APA vests prosecutorial and adjudicatory authority within the same agency,
subject to internal separation between enforcement staff and the agency’s
administrative law judges.161
But it is unexceptional to deviate from this default, as is done for tax
controversy. The Taft-Hartley Act, for example, divests the National Labor
Relations Board of enforcement discretion, which is instead vested with the
separately appointed General Counsel.162 This bespoke agency structure is
distinct from the default APA model, which would otherwise vest ultimate
prosecutorial discretion in the Board itself.163 In more dramatic breaks from
the APA, certain agencies adjudicate through separate independent commissions, while others must litigate in federal trial courts, just as the IRS does.
For its adjudications, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(“OSHA”) prosecutes cases, but the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission164—a separate, presidentially appointed independent commission—judges those cases.165 Similarly, the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Act provides that same non-APA structure: the Mine Safety and Health
Administration (“MSHA”) prosecutes cases while an independent commission—the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission—judges
158.
See, e.g., Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978) (discussing
Clean Air Act provision § 307(b), which only permits judicial review of “emission standards”
in the D.C. Circuit within 30 days of the standard’s promulgation).
159.
5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556(b) (2012).
160.
See Benjamin W. Mintz, Administrative Separation of Functions: OSHA and the
NLRB, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 877, 880-81 (1998) (“[T]he Attorney General’s Committee rejected institutional separation as unnecessary to insure fairness and because it entailed unacceptable costs to the administrative process. The Attorney General’s Committee therefore
recommended a structure which has come to be known as the internal separation of functions. This administrative arrangement was later incorporated into the APA as a requirement
for administrative agencies.”); Shepherd, supra note 114, at 1671 (describing, when the APA
was passed, conservative disappointment at the APA’s lack of institutional separation between administrative prosecuting and judging).
161.
5 U.S.C. § 556(b)(3). Notably, the agency head or heads can also hear administrative cases. Id. § 556(b)(1)-(2).
162.
29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (2012); see Mintz, supra note 160, at 881-82.
163.
See supra note 162.
164.
How OSHRC Works, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY REVIEW CO M M ’N, https://www
.oshrc.gov/about/how-oshrc-works/ (last updated Apr. 2006).
165.
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 659, 661.
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them.166 Then there are the agencies that, like the IRS, have to go to court.
When the Secretary of Labor seeks to enforce the Fair Labor Standards
Act, she generally has to sue in federal court.167 As with tax controversy,
there is no recourse to an administrative tribunal. The same is true for
enforcement of certain other federal labor laws168 and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act.169
As these examples illustrate, deviations from the APA adjudication
template do not make tax exceptional as an administrative law matter. For
Professor Puckett’s structural argument to be valid, it would have to necessarily follow that these other areas of federal law for which the APA template is altered to roughly the same extent are also administratively
exceptional.170 Indeed, one could argue that that the OSHA and MSHA
split-enforcement models—division between agency and independent commission—are more exceptional than administrative adjudication in federal
courts, which at least has a long historical pedigree.171 But of course, when it
comes to administrative law, commentators do not adduce OSHA to claim
occupational health exceptionalism or, for that matter, adduce MSHA to
166.
30 U.S.C. §§ 815(d), 823 (2012). For a brief overview of issues with this splitenforcement model, see ADMIN . CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 86-4: THE SPLITENFORCEMENT MODEL FOR AGENCY ADJUDICATION (1986), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/86-4.pdf.
167.
29 U.S.C. §§ 216(c), 217; DANIEL B. ABRAHAMS ET AL., EMPLOYER’S GUIDE TO THE FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS ACT ¶ 900 (2016).
168.
Mintz, supra note 160, at 909 (“Several recently enacted labor regulatory programs
have been modeled on the [Fair Labor Standards Act] structure, such as the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Polygraph Protection Act, and the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act (WARN), requiring notice to employees of certain plant closings, in that adjudication of enforcement actions takes place in the U.S. district courts.”).
169.
See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(f) (2012); Mintz, supra note 160, at 883. Although not as
relevant to this Article, bankruptcy law is also structurally anomalous relative to regular
administrative function, since it functions entirely as adjudication in the federal courts. See
Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. REV. 384 (2012).
170.
Professor McMahon makes a preliminary version of this argument when she argues
administrative law should not be broadly applicable. McMahon, supra note 5, at 588. (“[A]n
alternate approach recognizes the exceptional features of each agency. Not all scholars, including this one, accept that administrative law’s goal should be a broadly applicable procedural law.”). However, it is hard to conceive of what administrative law means when every
agency is exceptional. The more workable approach is to recognize that the vague dictates of
the APA and related administrative law doctrine are, in many respects, inherently contextual
in application (and that agency-specific procedures refine that template rather than upend
it). Recognizing that context-sensitivity within the doctrine contrasts with Professor McMahon’s proposal to Balkanize administrative law and thereby create an unworkably particularized administrative law for every field.
171.
See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE L OST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 65-78 (2012).
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claim mine safety exceptionalism. The same goes for labor and wage law
exceptionalism, as well as all the other areas of law just described. One
should be attuned to agency-specific alterations of the APA template, but
they do not support a finding of overarching exceptionalism.

2. Misinterpretation Argument
The second category of argument is that the anti-exceptionalists have
misinterpreted how the APA applies to tax, particularly given tax-specific
statutory alterations to the APA rulemaking template. Exceptionalism is
presented as a defense to this misinterpretation. Professor Puckett follows
this course in his response to Professor Hickman’s arguments about, for
instance, which “tax rules qualify as ‘interpretative’ ” under the APA and
“the validity of temporary tax regulations” vis-à-vis APA notice-and-comment requirements.172 He reviews Professor Hickman’s interpretation of
how certain Code and APA provisions interrelate and explains how other
anti-exceptionalists could build on her interpretive arguments to severely
undercut tax administration.173 Professor Puckett provides an alternative
statutory interpretation that he believes better reflects statutory intent and
avoids undercutting tax rulemaking.174
Regardless of the merits of Professor Puckett’s interpretive arguments,
they should not be made through tax exceptionalism. Unquestionably, important administrative law issues—like the interaction between the APA
and related administrative law principles on the one hand and certain taxspecific statutory provisions on the other; and how certain inherently contextual APA provisions should be interpreted for tax—remain unsettled.
But these issues can (and should) be argued and settled without resorting to
exceptionalism. As explained above, there is nothing exceptional in the
structural interaction of the APA and tax statutes. These same interactions
arise in other, decidedly unexceptional areas of law. Moreover, for the strategic reasons detailed at the beginning of this Part, one should generally
avoid the exceptionalist mode. Here, exceptionalism does not help to further arguments on these interpretive issues.

3. Normative Argument
A third pro-exceptionalism argument is that tax should be exceptional
because APA compliance is normatively undesirable. The response here is
172.
Puckett, supra note 5, at 1072.
173.
Id. at 1097-1101.
174.
Id. at 1097-98 (arguing for an IRS-friendly interpretation of I.R.C. § 7805, which
the IRS could then, at least theoretically, employ to nullify court losses from APA procedural challenges).
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twofold. First, what APA compliance means for tax is still unsettled (and,
thus, whether that compliance is normatively desirable is also unsettled).
Second, broader distaste for the APA is a question of general administrative
law that is irrelevant to whether the APA applies to tax in the first instance.
To support this normative argument, Professor McMahon emphasizes
the problems that APA compliance is commonly alleged to cause. Because
arbitrary and capricious review occurs after the fact (and given that the
APA is often as much judicial construct as statute), it is hard to anticipate
how exacting courts will be in their review of agency reasoning.175 That
judicial unpredictability leads to: (1) over-allocation of agency resources to
rulemaking processes and (2) overly commonplace judicial invalidation of
promulgated rules. In the notice-and-comment process, agencies must respond to material comments that they receive, but especially in major
rulemakings with potentially thousands of comments, it can be next-to-impossible to determine which comments a court will deem material.176 Sophisticated parties can exploit this informational mire by using comments as
a weapon to slow down the agency. To this end, these parties can also flood
the agency with information to “capture” it.177 As Professor McMahon
notes, this burdensome process has arguably led to the “ossification” of
agency rulemaking, with rulemaking processes allegedly slowing (and even
halting) under these procedural burdens.178 This ossification would be particularly poisonous to tax law, given the “[s]everal specialized tax statutes
. . . enacted annually” and “[t]he trend toward short-term legislation with
sunset provisions” that “increase[ ] the need for . . . more rapidly issued tax
guidance.”179
175.
McMahon, supra note 5, at 579 (noting “courts function as ‘robbed [sic] roulette
wheels’ when reviewing agency guidance” (quoting JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND
GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 181 (1997))).
176.
Id.; PIERCE, supra note 82, § 7.4 (“An agency can require years of time and tens of
thousands of person-hours to identify, analyze, and respond to all the criticisms and suggested alternatives contained in comments in a manner that a court is likely to consider
adequate . . . .”).
177.
McMahon, supra note 5, at 590 (“[A] taxpayer might inundate the Treasury Department with arguments and evidence with the goal of shaping guidance, possibly by drowning
out other interested parties’ voices.”).
178.
Id. at 579 (“Ossification is the idea that procedural constraints imposed on federal
agencies have the undesirable consequence of making the process so burdensome that agencies routinely delay or defer issuing guidance.”); see, e.g., RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO,
THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS AND THE BATTLE TO PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 72-93, 146-69 (2010);
Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J.
1385, 1388 (1992) (“Important rulemaking initiatives grind along at such a deliberate pace
that they are often consigned to regulatory purgatory, never to be resurrected again.”).
179.
McMahon, supra note 5, at 604.
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Professor McMahon argues that, given these risks, tax exceptionalism
should be maintained, at least for the time being. As she writes, “[s]imply
shoehorning tax . . . into a general administrative procedure without assessing either the risks or likelihood of success for that shoehorning is dangerous.”180 Professor McMahon seemingly believes that Treasury’s current
administrative procedures work reasonably well under the circumstances,
and that in any event, Treasury’s “shortcomings are unlikely to be resolved
with stricter adherence to APA procedure.”181
This argument is unconvincing for two reasons. First, it presupposes
that the Hickman school is correct about the burdensome and destabilizing
way that the APA applies to tax. Indeed, it effectively concedes that argument by presenting tax exceptionalism as the foil. That response will fail, as
tax exceptionalism continues its inexorable decline. As this Article argues,
the burdensome and destabilizing aspects of the Hickman school can be
countered by arguing within the APA rather than against it.
Second, any remaining, irresolvable problems with the APA and general
administrative law doctrine are just that—problems of general administrative
law. These problems should be subject to general administrative law reforms, however difficult the reform process may be. Indeed, the EPA cannot simply refuse to follow informal rulemaking procedures or other
reasoned administration requirements because the agency finds flaws in certain aspects of the APA. The same is true for tax. Administrative law, like
the Cleveland Browns (or, for that matter, any human endeavor), will always be in need of serious improvement. But it is not tenable to refuse the
APA until its judicial implementation is, in some idealistic and immeasurable sense, good enough. The APA and related administrative law principles
are trans-substantive by nature,182 even if they are contextual in certain aspects of their implementation. The tax community should work toward administrative law reforms where appropriate, but given that undeniable
trans-substance, we still need to operate within this administrative law in
the interim.

B. The Present Relevance of Exceptionalism’s History
Before turning to the major debates over APA-compliant tax rulemaking, it is important to give tax exceptionalism its due. Tax exceptionalism
has been overthrown, and as established in Part II.A, the remaining arguments for it are unconvincing. But what’s past is, of course, relevant to the
present. Tax exceptionalism was the law of tax administration until the last
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 589.
Id. at 601.
See 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012).
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decade or so. It is not that Treasury has been flagrantly violating the APA
and only recently been called to account. Treasury practice was, in effect,
the law for quite some time. Tax exceptionalism was an era, not an error. To
illustrate this point, this Part II.B reviews the historical legitimacy of the
now-vestigial “specific/general distinction” in tax rulemaking, a doctrinal
fulcrum of tax exceptionalism. This historical review demonstrates the
widespread acceptance of exceptionalism, including by the Supreme Court
and the twentieth century’s best tax and administrative lawyers.
This point is important to establish here because it is not just historical.
It influences how the Treasury should transition to APA compliance moving
forward (as well as how courts should manage and police this transition).
When it comes to tax administration, courts are managing a transition from
one established administrative practice to another. As such, courts should be
thoughtful before they invalidate tax rules promulgated long ago, during the
exceptionalist era in accordance with exceptionalist doctrine. To this end,
courts should at least consider a recent proposal to employ the remedy of
so-called “remand without vacatur” in some situations.183

1. Case Study: The Specific/General Distinction
Two key points support this historical account of tax exceptionalism.
The first can be expressed briefly and concerns the APA itself. As discussed
above,184 the APA is amorphous and evolving (and thus sometimes a vehicle
for a judge-made law of administrative control). The APA’s language is so
vague that, if one were so inclined, it could be colorably construed to facilitate many aspects of tax exceptionalism. That construction is not the prevailing or most reasonable one, but it is colorable nevertheless. If the APA
were a technical checklist, then one could more readily depict tax exceptionalism as flagrant non-compliance. But that is not the nature of the APA.
Second, tax exceptionalism was not some hidden, rogue conspiracy. Until the last decade or so, exceptionalism was a widely accepted and theorized
practice, all the way up to the Supreme Court. Historical views of Treasury’s rulemaking authority exemplify this point. But before providing this
history, some background is necessary.
In promulgating regulations under the Code, Treasury has two forms of
statutory authority for its rulemaking: (1) specific grants of rulemaking authority in particular Code sections185 (“specific authority”) and (2) general
authority under I.R.C. § 7805(a) to “prescribe all needful rules and regula183.
184.
185.
THORITY

See Judicial Review, supra note 17, at 1752-53.
See supra Part I.B.
N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON L EGISLATIVE GRANTS OF REGULATORY AU2 (2006) [hereinafter NYSB REPORT], http://old.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders
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tions” (“general authority”). Historically, a key tenet of tax exceptionalism
turned on the distinction between specific and general authority. The standard view was that I.R.C. § 7805(a) “authorize[d] only interpretive rules”
while specific authority grants “authorized legislative rules.”186 Recall from
Part I.B.1 that the APA exempts interpretive rules from its notice-and-comment requirements.187 Hence, for quite some time, the prevailing understanding in the tax community was that tax regulations promulgated
pursuant to general authority were interpretive (and thus exempt from the
APA’s notice-and-comment requirements), while specific authority regulations were legislative (and so subject to required pre-promulgation notice
and comment).188 Given regulations viewed as general authority outnumbered specific authority regulations, this convention allowed Treasury to
claim that most of its regulations were exempt from APA notice and comment.189 This differentiation between legislative and interpretive rules
under the APA based on general and specific statutory authority was, indeed, exceptional; the convention was unique to tax law.190
This specific/general authority distinction—again, a cornerstone of exceptionalism because it exempted most Treasury rulemaking from pre-promulgation notice and comment—had an impressive intellectual pedigree. In
the years leading up to the APA’s passage, “several eminent tax scholars,”
20/TaxLawSection/TaxReports/1121Report.pdf (“[T]here are more than 550 individual provisions of the Code that provide grants of authority to promulgate regulations . . . .”).
186.
Merrill & Watts, supra note 30, at 574.
187.
5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(2).
188.
See Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3, at 1761 (“The tax community generally tends to
differentiate the two types of Treasury regulations by calling specific authority regulations
‘legislative’ and general authority ones ‘interpretative.’ ”); NYSB REPORT, supra note 185, at
10 (“To a tax practitioner, the term ‘legislative regulations’ refers to regulations promulgated
pursuant to a specific grant of authority by Congress to the Treasury Department Legislative
regulations are often viewed as having the force and effect of law, because they entail an
exercise of power delegated by Congress to the Treasury Department for a specific purpose.
In contrast to legislative regulations, the term ‘interpretive regulations’ (at least as the term
is used by tax practitioners) refers to Treasury regulations issued under the general grant of
authority set forth in Section 7805(a).”).
189.
E.g., IRM 32.1.5.4.7.5.1 (Sept. 30, 2011) (“[M]ost IRS/Treasury regulations will be
interpretative regulations”); see also NYSB REPORT, supra note 185, at 11-12; Dembitzer, supra
note 30, at 503 (“Treasury Regulations promulgated under the general rulemaking authority
of section 7805 are classified as ‘interpretive regulations’ by the courts because they merely
interpret statutory provisions enacted by Congress. By contrast, Treasury Regulations which
are issued under a specific grant of rulemaking authority to the Secretary by Congress are
‘legislative regulations.’ ”); Asimow, supra note 20, at 358 (“[T]ax authorities almost uniformly assume that regulations adopted pursuant to the Treasury’s general rulemaking power
in section 7805(a) of the Code are interpretive and that rules adopted pursuant to specific
grants of rulemaking authority are legislative.”).
190.
See Merrill & Watts, supra note 30, at 570-75.
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codified the distinction in “a series of articles.”191 The writers include the
inimitable Stanley Surrey192 and Erwin Griswold—a Solicitor General and
Dean of Harvard Law School. Surrey’s core argument for the specific/general distinction was that, without it, specific authority would be redundant
to general authority.193 Griswold cited favorably to Surrey’s article and to
another article arguing that legislative rules under general authority would
violate the non-delegation doctrine.194 Post-APA, the specific/general distinction found its way into the work of towering administrative law scholar
Kenneth Culp Davis, who gave the distinction his imprimatur.195 Given
“the influential role that Davis’s treatises played in the administrative law
world, his attention to the tax scholars’ writings and to the interpretive
nature of Treasury’s general rulemaking grant may have ensured the perpetuation of that understanding in the tax world.”196 In other words, this cornerstone of tax exceptionalism persisted, at least in part, because it had the
backing of one of America’s all-time great administrative law scholars.197
191.
Id. at 574; e.g., Ellsworth C. Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case,
40 COLUM. L. REV. 252, 257 (1950) (“It is submitted that this difference is that Congress
intended to confer a legislative power in [specific authority] to prescribe the details of a
reasonable depletion allowance, and an interpretative power in [general authority] to assist in
the execution of the statute by administrative officials.”); Randolph E. Paul, Use and Abuse of
Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction, 49 YALE L.J. 660, 683 (1940) (noting the “distinction
between purely interpretative regulations issued under the general aegis of [general authority] and regulations specifically authorized by particular provisions of the statute.”); see
Bryan T. Camp, A History of Tax Regulation Prior to the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 DUKE
L.J. 1673, 1714 (2014).
192.
Donald C. Lubick, As I Remember Stanley Surrey, 24 TAX NOTES 1083, 1083 (1984)
(“It is no exaggeration to compare Stanley Surrey’s position in the field of tax policy to
Shakespeare’s in the field of drama or Aristotle’s in philosophy. He was a giant whose like we
are not apt to see again.”).
193.
Stanley S. Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations Under the Income,
Estate, and Gift Taxes, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 556, 558 (1940).
194.
Erwin N. Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. REV. 398,
398 n.1, 400 n.10 (1941).
195.
E.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Rules-Interpretative, Legislative, and Retroactive, 57 YALE L.J. 919, 930 (1948) (“A leading example of interpretative regulations is the
huge bulk of tax regulations issued by the Treasury Department, most of which now rest
upon [general authority]. But many provisions of the tax regulations . . . are legislative rules,
because they spring from grants of power to create new law [specific authority].”).
196.
Merrill & Watts, supra note 30, at 575 n.612.
197.
Decades later, Professor Davis recognized that case law was loose with the specific/
general distinction, but his discussion also reinforces that the distinction was effectively the
law for quite some time. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 5.03-3
(Supp. June 1976) (noting that the specific/general distinction “still has support in the case
law. . . . [b]ut . . . the distinction between legislative and interpretive rules is much less sharp
than it once was.”).
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The specific/general distinction not only garnered support among theorists, but also was effectively endorsed by the Supreme Court. Indeed,
before Mayo Foundation, the distinction was so entrenched in Supreme
Court jurisprudence that some believed “it will probably remain secure, unless and until Congress amends the Code.”198 The Court repeatedly affirmed the distinction when, pre-Mayo Foundation, it considered the
specific/general distinction to determine the proper level of deference due
to different Treasury regulations. These cases are not ancient. The Court
followed the distinction in Rowan Companies, Inc. v. United States199 in 1981
and again in United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co. in 1982.200 Indeed, it countenanced the distinction as late as 2003.201 The distinction also persisted in
many lower courts through the decades.202 The Tax Court—not even ten
years before repudiating exceptionalism in Altera—endorsed the distinction
in 2006!203 This judicial acceptance buttresses the point about the APA’s
judicial construction. The statute was amorphous enough to support this
exceptionalist construction and, in Mayo Foundation, to contravene it.
In addition, Congress acquiesced to the specific/general distinction. In
its original form, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (“RFA”),204 which imposes
added procedural requirements on rulemakings that impact small businesses, only applied to rules required to go through § 553 notice and comment.205 Because of the general/specific distinction, Treasury took the view
that most of its regulations were exempt from the RFA.206 In response,
Congress expanded the RFA to apply when Treasury “publishes a notice of
198.
Merrill & Watts, supra note 30, at 575 n.612.
199.
Rowan Cos., v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981).
200.
United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982).
201.
Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 448 (2003); see also Asimow, supra note
20, at 359 (accepting the specific/general distinction).
202.
E.g., Lomont v. O’Neill, 285 F.3d 9, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (describing I.R.C.
§ 7805(a) as “nothing more than a general grant of interpretative rulemaking power” (emphasis added) (citing Alvord, supra note 191; Surrey, supra note 193; Asimow, supra note 20));
DeTreville v. United States, 445 F.2d 1306, 1311 (4th Cir. 1971); Allstate Ins. v. United
States, 329 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1964).
203.
Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 126 T.C. 96, 129 (2006), vacated, 515 F.3d 162
(3d Cir. 2008); see Lee A. Sheppard, Tax Court Flunks the Brand X Test, 110 TAX NOTES 585,
588 (2006). The Third Circuit overruled the Tax Court on this point two years later.
204.
5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12 (2012).
205.
Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, § 3(a), 94 Stat. 1164, 1166 (1980).
206.
E.g., 142 CONG. REC. E571, E573-74 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Henry J. Hyde). Treasury anticipated it would follow this interpretation well before the
original RFA was even passed. See The Regulatory Flexibility Act: Joint Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the Select
Comm. on Small Bus., 95th Cong. 330 (1978) (letter of Henry C. Stookell, Jr., Deputy General Counsel, Department of the Treasury) (“We assume that the intent is not to reach such
interpretative actions under [an early draft of the RFA]”).
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proposed rulemaking for an interpretative rule involving the internal revenue laws.”207 By providing this “special rule” for interpretive tax regulations
in the RFA,208 Congress effectively accepted (or at least chose not to repudiate) the specific/general distinction.

2. The Present Relevance to the Revolution
All this does not mean that the exceptionalist general/specific distinction should be continued. To the contrary, specific rulemaking grants in the
Code are so scattershot and varied that it is hard to believe Congress uniformly intended them as legislative delegations, in contrast to solely interpretive power under § 7805(a).209 Not to mention, this specific/general
authority rule is entirely particular to tax and appears nowhere else in federal law.210
Rather, the point is that exceptionalism was not a mistake. It was the
law. We are rightly transitioning away from it, but contrary to the tone in
much anti-exceptionalist scholarship, Treasury was not historically violating
the law, at least in many aspects of exceptionalism. When it comes to the
revolution in tax administration, courts are managing a transition from one
established administrative practice to another.
As such, courts should be thoughtful before they invalidate tax rules
promulgated long ago, during the exceptionalist era in accordance with exceptionalist doctrine. If such a rule would have been considered validly
promulgated in its time, it is potentially problematic to invalidate that rule
because of modern evolution in doctrine.211 Indeed, much of anti-exceptionalism’s potentially destabilizing effect on the integrity of tax regulations
derives from this administrative retroactivity. It is difficult to draw firm
lines here, in terms of when Treasury should be considered “on notice” that
its exceptionalist practices were no longer accepted (and, thus, courts should
be less hesitant to invalidate). This Article does not develop a comprehensive judicial theory on this point, but merely states the principle that courts
207.
Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, § 241(a),
110 Stat 847, 864.
208.
ABA Report, supra note 26, at 739.
209.
NYSB REPORT, supra note 185, at 5 (“Within categories of grants, there can be
significant variation in the wording employed by Congress. For the most part, this variation
appears to be an accident of drafting rather than an intention to provide substantively different standards.”).
210.
Merrill & Watts, supra note 30, at 571-75.
211.
See Camp, supra note 191, at 1714-15 (“Those who write in this area must not fall
into the presentist fallacy of assuming that the terms of the APA contain meaning independent of history and of the administrative context to which they are applied.”). Cf. CANE, supra
note 98, at 511 (discussing “the law’s mindfulness of time” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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should potentially judge Treasury rulemaking processes in their historical
context.
As part of this historically informed approach,212 courts could at least
consider a recent proposal to employ the remedy of so-called “remand without vacatur” in some situations.213 Through remand without vacatur, “a
court may remand a faulty rule to an agency to fix a defect, but still allow
the rule to remain in effect temporarily.”214 Treasury would thus be given
time to cure a procedural defect while leaving the substantive rule operational. Where courts are uncomfortable with the procedural aspects of historical Treasury regulations, this remedy could perhaps address problems of
now outdated historical practice without destabilizing the tax system.

III. APA-COMPLIANT RULEMAKING: CURRENT THEORY
& WORKABLE ALTERNATIVES
Part II contended with the past of tax administration. Part III now
contends with the future. Based on the principles established in Parts I &
II, Part III analyzes prevailing anti-exceptionalist administrative theory in
the context of tax rulemaking. In this analysis, Part III provides critiques of
(and alternatives to) prevailing anti-exceptionalist arguments about tax administration. The goal is to demonstrate that the APA can provide for more
workable and far less destabilizing administrative standards than leading
anti-exceptionalists claim.
First, Part III.A provides empirical context that challenges the overarching, anti-exceptionalist claim that Treasury is egregiously non-compliant with the APA’s requirement for pre-promulgation notice and comment.
Moving from empiricism to doctrine, Part III.B then examines the antiexceptionalist view of when Treasury is doctrinally required, under the
APA, to engage in pre-promulgation notice and comment. Specifically, Part
III.B examines debates over (i) Treasury’s application of the interpretive
and good cause exceptions to APA rulemaking and (ii) relatedly, Treasury’s
use of temporary regulations to avoid pre-promulgation notice and comment. Part III.B concludes that anti-exceptionalists are misguided when
they claim that these exceptions are virtually non-existent in the tax law.
Part III.C then moves from exceptions to notice and comment to its sub212.
Cf. Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts, Categories, and Compliance in the
Regulatory State, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1151, 1154 (2010) (“Law is, of course, always a product of
its history.”).
213.
See Judicial Review, supra note 17, at 1752-53. Cf. Nicholas Bagley, Remedial Restraint
in Administrative Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 253 (2017) (advocating a more flexible and contextual approach to remedy in administrative law).
214.
Judicial Review, supra note 17, at 1752.

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\7-2\MEA204.txt

388

unknown

Seq: 36

26-APR-18

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

11:10

[Vol. 7:2

stance. It argues that State Farm reason-giving—the required scope of which
is necessarily a matter of context—does not need to be excessively burdensome in tax law.

A. Empirical Context for APA Avoidance Claims
As this Article offers a workable approach to APA-compliant tax administration, it is important to establish an empirical baseline. Even accepting, arguendo, Professor Hickman’s interpretations of administrative
law, Treasury is not egregiously non-compliant with the APA’s informal
rulemaking requirements, relatively speaking. Looking at overall statistics,
Treasury “is not exceptional in its dismissal of notice and comment.”215 Average agency practice may itself be doctrinally insufficient, but this empirical frame is still important.
Based on her review of pre-Mayo Foundation tax administration, Professor Hickman has criticized “[w]idespread Treasury noncompliance with the
APA”216 because of, at least in part, Treasury’s allegedly low use of § 553
pre-promulgation notice and comment. At least partially as a result of her
conclusions, the narrative has become that Treasury is an outlier among
administrative agencies in its egregious APA non-compliance. In her study
of Treasury’s APA practices, Professor Hickman found that Treasury failed
to comply with APA § 553’s notice-and-comment requirements in 40.9% of
rulemakings during the studied period.217 This study has become a key empirical basis for the anti-exceptionalist critique.
Broader empirical context demonstrates that, among federal agencies,
Treasury is relatively typical in its notice and comment practice. As a recent
study showed, “Agencies avoided the notice-and-comment process on almost 52% of rules on which final action was taken from 1995 to 2012.”218
(To ‘avoid’ the APA is to claim, rightly or wrongly, one of the APA’s exceptions to required notice and comment.)219 The 40.9% avoidance rate in
Hickman’s study is below the ~52% average for federal agencies in the
broader APA study. To compare apples-to-apples, the broader APA study
215.
McMahon, supra note 5, at 587.
216.
Hickman, Responding, supra note 3, at 1157.
217.
Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3, at 1749 tbl.1. Most of these notice-and-comment
failures are instances where Treasury issued temporary regulations without pre-promulgation
notice and comment, an issue that is discussed extensively below. See infra Part III.B.3.
218.
Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN . L. REV. 65, 91
(2015); see also Abbe R. Gluck et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1800-01 tbl.1 (2015) (citing Professor Raso’s study and other data to
argue that such “unconventional rulemaking [without advanced notice and comment] . . .
appears to be on the rise”).
219.
Raso, supra note 218, at 68.
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found a 47.6% avoidance rate for Treasury,220 again below the average. A
separate GAO study found that, across 52 federal agencies from 2003-2010,
35% of major rules and 44% of nonmajor rules were issued without advance
notice and comment.221 If those GAO numbers are blended,222 the 40.9%
from Professor Hickman’s study again roughly matches the average. One
can argue over whether the studied agencies improperly invoke the exceptions to notice and comment—the good cause exception,223 the interpretive
exception,224 etc. However, as these comparative studies show, this problem
is common throughout administrative law and is not endemic to tax. Treasury is unexceptional in this regard, even though Professor Hickman’s taxspecific work indicates the opposite.225
A dedicated descriptivist could make the argument that the law of the
APA is a matter of metrics, defined by how the statute is applied through
time. In this view, at least broadly speaking, insofar as the metrics of Treasury’s APA practices match the agency average, Treasury is APA-compliant.
This Article does not make that more provocative argument, but this comparative empirical background does, in certain respects, reframe current debates over tax administration. Even if unique in historical background and
certain particulars, Treasury’s APA compliance problems are, at the
broadest level, in line with issues at other agencies. Much remains to be
debated and improved in Treasury’s APA practice, but viewed relatively,
Treasury is not facing a unique crisis of APA compliance.

B. Doctrinal Debates over Notice and Comment
Work like that of Professor Hickman also argues that, on a doctrinal
level, Treasury fails to comply with APA § 553. However, when the APA is
properly understood as this Article has described above, it becomes clear
that such critiques are not neutrally conveying immutable administrative
law, but advocating judicial policy choices vis-à-vis how APA § 553 relates
to tax law. These policy choices may be superior to current practice, but
they do not represent some absolute law that cannot be debated.
Specifically with regard to § 553, Professor Hickman argues that Treasury has improperly invoked the interpretive and good cause exceptions to
220.
See id. at 129 tbl.2.
221.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-21, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGENCIES COULD
TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO RESPOND TO PUBLIC COMMENTS 9 fig.1 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/
assets/660/651052.pdf.
222.
And weighted properly, given the vastly greater number of nonmajor rules.
223.
See infra Part III.B.1.
224.
See infra Part III.B.2.
225.
See Hickman, Unpacking, supra note 31, at 472 (claiming “indiscriminate” APA noncompliance by Treasury).
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notice and comment.226 In doing so, she takes a formalistic approach to an
area of administrative law that is deeply contextual and amorphous. As inherently contextual categories with decades of mixed and conflicting precedent, it is an open question how these exceptions apply to tax rulemaking.
To be clear, it is not that tax is exceptional. Rather, these APA provisions, as
applied to tax as to any other domain, are inherently unsettled and contextual. Professor Hickman offers arguments for applying these exceptions
quite narrowly to tax, but other arguments can also be made.227 Again, contrary to Professor Hickman’s portrayal, the ultimate resolution here is, to a
large degree, a matter of judicial policy choice. One view or another is not,
in the pre-policy abstract, “the law.”
This Article argues that, in the tax context, courts should adopt much of
how Professor Hickman proposes to apply the interpretive exception (and,
to a lesser extent, her thinking on the good cause exception).228 However, in
certain respects, her proposed applications are too narrow, both as a matter
of policy and how these exceptions are commonly understood. When these
overly narrow aspects of her proposals are removed, it goes a long way toward rectifying the crisis in tax administration that would otherwise result
from her proposals.

1. The Interpretive Exception
This Part discusses the application to tax of the so-called interpretive
exception to APA notice and comment. This discussion is broken down into
a sketch of doctrinal background in Part III.B.1.a; a preliminary application
of that doctrine to tax in Part III.B.1.b; and a rebuttal of Professor Hickman’s far narrower application in Part III.B.1.c.

a. Interpretive Regulations in Administrative Law
In determining whether the APA’s rulemaking requirements apply to an
agency action, “[t]he most important distinction is between legislative rules
and interpretative rules.”229 On a general level, an interpretive230 rule is “an
‘interpretation’ of a statute or legislative regulation rather than . . . an
226.
See infra Part III.B.1-2.
227.
See infra Part III.B.1-2.
228.
This argument is subject to this Article’s expectations for tax reason-giving discussed infra in Part III.C.
229.
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN . L. REV. 547, 547 (2000) [hereinafter Pierce, Distinguishing].
230.
While the statute refers to “interpretative” rules, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012) (emphasis added), the modern practice, which this Article follows, is to use the term “interpretive.” See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 n.1 (2015).

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\7-2\MEA204.txt

Spring 2018]

unknown

Reworking the Revolution

Seq: 39

26-APR-18

11:10

391

exercise of independent policymaking authority.”231 In other words, interpretive rules clarify (or more narrowly elaborate on) existing statutes or
legislative regulations, but do not themselves create new law.232 By contrast,
legislative rules more independently make law.
The APA exempts interpretive rules from notice and comment,233 and
that exemption “makes the process of issuing interpretive rules comparatively easier for agencies than issuing legislative rules.”234 However, “that
convenience comes at a price,” for interpretive rules “do not have the force
and effect of law and are not accorded that weight in the adjudicatory process.”235 Thus, interpretive rules are far easier to promulgate, but at least
theoretically are accorded less weight by courts.
Beyond this circular definition that interpretive rules interpret rather
than legislate,236 what, exactly, qualifies as an interpretive rule? The term
“is not . . . defined by the APA, and its precise meaning” provokes “much
scholarly and judicial debate.”237 Indeed, courts and commentators perennially bemoan how unclear the definition of interpretive rule is.238 However,
even if it defines the problem more than solves it, one D.C. Circuit opinion—American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Administration, as
modified by certain subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence—has become
the predominant test to determine if a rule is interpretive.239 In terms of
the precise test used in different courts of appeals, there is a good deal of
messiness and variation.240 For brevity’s sake, this Article will only consider
231.
John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 916 (2004).
232.
PIERCE, supra note 82, § 6.4 (“[A]n interpretative rule cannot impose obligations on
citizens that exceed those fairly attributable to Congress through the process of statutory
interpretation.”).
233.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
234.
Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. at 1204.
235.
Id. (quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995)).
236.
See U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 30 n.3 (1947) (describing interpretive rules as “rules or statements issued by an
agency to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the statutes and rules which it
administers”).
237.
Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. at 1204.
238.
E.g., Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1108-09
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (cataloguing colorful language in case law to this effect); Manning, supra
note 231, at 893 (“Among the many complexities that trouble administrative law, few rank
with that of sorting valid from invalid uses of so-called ‘nonlegislative rules.’ ”); Pierce,
Distinguishing, supra note 229, at 547-48 (also cataloguing).
239.
PIERCE, supra note 82, § 6.4 at 454 (“[T]he American Mining Congress opinion was
followed within the circuit and adopted by six other circuits.”); see also Pierce, Distinguishing,
supra note 229, at 548 (“[A] single 1993 opinion of the D.C. Circuit does an excellent job of
identifying all of the criteria that are important in distinguishing between legislative rules
and interpretative rules.”).
240.
E.g., Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165, 169-72 (7th Cir. 1996).
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the American Mining framework. In any event, I believe the conclusions here
would be largely the same across different judicial tests of the legislative/
interpretive distinction.
The core facts of American Mining help exemplify what interpretive
regulations do. In that case, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) had promulgated legislative regulations that required mine operators to promptly report when miners were diagnosed with certain occupational illnesses,
including the lung disease pneumoconiosis.241 In response to inquiries from
mine operators, the DOL released, without notice and comment, guidance
that interpreted what constituted a diagnosis of pneumoconiosis for purposes of the regulation, based on a medical standard for analyzing chest xrays.242 The DOL argued that APA notice and comment was not required
for that guidance because it was an interpretive rule. The D.C. Circuit
agreed with the government, and the DOL guidance in that case can be
viewed as illustrative of what constitutes an interpretive rule.
As modified by subsequent legal developments, the American Mining
test for interpretive rules is as follows. A rule is interpretive if the rule and
its legal context generally possess all the following characteristics: (1) the
agency labels the rule as interpretive;243 (2) “in the absence of the rule[,]
there would . . . be an adequate legislative basis for enforcement action or
other agency action to confer benefits or ensure the performance of duties;”244 and (3) the rule does not “repudiate” and is not “irreconcilable with”
an existing legislative rule.245 The second prong does most of the work in the
241.
Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1107-08.
242.
Id.
243.
Id. at 1110-11.
244.
PIERCE, supra note 82, § 6.4; see Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1109 (explaining that
a rule should be deemed legislative if “in the absence of a legislative rule by the agency, the
legislative basis for agency enforcement would be inadequate”). I would argue that the judicial observations that a rule cannot be interpretive if it builds expansively upon a legislative
regulation that is itself vague (or merely parrots a statute) are subsumed under this prong.
See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); United States v. Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
245.
Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1109 (quoting Nat’l Family Planning & Reprod.
Health Ass’n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 235 (D.C.Cir. 1992)). The Supreme Court has, of
course, mercifully overruled the D.C. Circuit’s so-called “one-bite doctrine”—that an amendment to an interpretive rule must necessarily be legislative. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n,
135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015). It is also fair to say that American Mining’s argument that CFR
publication indicates a legislative rule has since come to a welcome demise. See Health Ins.
Ass’n of Am. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1994); JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINIS TRATIVE L AW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC L AW SYSTEM 668 (7th ed. 2015) (“[T]he D.C. Circuit has
since deleted publication in the C.F.R from this list [of interpretive rule criteria].”); Pierce,
Distinguishing, supra note 229, at 560 (noting that American Mining factors have been
“amended . . . to delete the CFR publication criterion”).
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analysis. By asking whether the rule is necessary to agency action, the
American Mining test ensures that an interpretive rule does not “reflect excessive policymaking discretion, but rather reflects sufficient policy guidance from an antecedent statute or legislative regulation.”246 If a rule is
necessary to an adequate legislative basis for agency action, then that rule
involves too much agency policymaking to qualify as interpretive. The understandable logic is that such policymaking must be subject to § 553’s
constraints.247

b. Interpretive Regulations in Tax Rulemaking
In terms of how this paradigm applies to tax rulemaking, Professor
Hickman brings us a long way toward a better answer. Her empirical and
interpretive work demonstrates how the specific/general authority distinction—which, as discussed above, the IRS long-treated as the basis for delineating legislative and interpretive regulations248—fails to map on to the
American Mining test (or anything like it). But this Article disagrees with
her further argument—with which the Tax Court seemingly agreed in Altera249—that interpretive rules are effectively nonexistent in the tax law.
Indeed, this portion of her argument swings tax administration from one
extreme—most tax regulations are interpretive—to another extreme—virtually no tax regulations are ever interpretive. To the contrary, notwithstanding certain penalty provisions in the Code associated with interpretive rules,
tax regulations may still qualify as interpretive. However, the inquiry is
necessarily case-by-case, and one would expect the number of interpretive
tax regulations to fall in the reasonable middle between what exceptionalists
and prevailing anti-exceptionalists claim.
Let us begin with common ground with Professor Hickman. For tax, a
notable facet of the American Mining test is that it is facially unconcerned
with whether the statutory basis for issuing a rule is specific or general. As
Professor Hickman has documented, notwithstanding the foundational importance of the specific/general distinction to tax exceptionalism, Treasury
has been unsystematic in its invocation of general or specific statutory authority in relation to its compliance with APA notice and comment.250 Subject to the historical validity of the specific/general distinction as discussed
in Part II.B.2, Professor Hickman persuasively argues that the distinction is
246.
Manning, supra note 231, at 894.
247.
See id. at 920.
248.
IRM 4.10.7.2.3.2; see supra Part II.B.1.
249.
See Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91, 116-17 (2015).
250.
Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3, at 1757 (“In sum, the only pattern with respect to
APA compliance that emerges from analyzing Treasury’s reliance on specific as opposed to
general authority is no pattern at all.”).
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inconsistent with modern administrative practice.251 Indeed, the Supreme
Court effectively agreed with her in Mayo Foundation, given the directly
proportionate relationship between judicial deference and the force of
law.252
How significant it is to repudiate the specific/general distinction should
not be understated. At least as far as rulemaking goes, the specific/general
distinction is foundational to tax exceptionalism, for it largely exempted
Treasury from APA notice and comment.
However, this Article disagrees with Professor Hickman about how the
interpretive exception applies to tax once the specific/general distinction is
jettisoned. Before arguing against Professor Hickman’s view that virtually
no tax regulations are ever interpretive, this Article will provide its own
positive vision of what the interpretive exception means in APA-compliant
tax administration.
To start with the obvious, far more tax regulations—particularly the
most consequential and controversial rules—are legislative under American
Mining than under the specific/general distinction. One need simply look at
the American Mining test to understand why. The key inquiry is whether “in
the absence of the rule[,] there would . . . be an adequate legislative basis for
enforcement action or other agency action to confer benefits or ensure the
performance of duties.”253 For many tax regulations, the answer is no. Most
obviously, many areas of the tax law are almost entirely defined through
regulation. Regulations in such areas are necessarily legislative (unless they
merely interpret existing legislative regulations). Transfer pricing is an excellent example. The statutory basis for the IRS’ transfer pricing authority
is two sentences.254 The extremely technical regulations under that section
fill 195 CFR pages with biblically dense text.255 It is hard to argue that
those two statutory sentences provide an “adequate legislative basis for en-

251.
Id. at 1762-63 (“[A]t least outside of the tax area, specific versus general authority
origins no longer distinguish legislative from interpretative rules. Regulations that bind both
the government and regulated parties are legislative, whether promulgated pursuant to specific or general statutory authority. In other areas of administrative law, regulations adopted
under general authority carry the same legal force and effect as those promulgated pursuant
to specific authority.”).
252.
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
253.
PIERCE, supra note 82, § 6.4.
254.
I.R.C. § 482 (2012).
255.
See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.482-0 –1.482-9 (2015).
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forcement”256 for most (if not all) of the standards codified in those
regulations.257
Legislative tax regulations are not limited to such acutely statute-sparse
areas. Again, in the international context, consider the source rules for purchased inventory.258 For purchased (rather than manufactured) inventory,
the sales revenue is statutorily sourced as domestic or foreign based on
where the purchased inventory is sold or exchanged—the “title passage”
rule. However, even if one follows the title passage rule in both form and
substance, the regulations create an additional rule of intent. If an inventory
sale “is arranged in a particular manner for the primary purpose of tax
avoidance,” then the title passage rule does not apply (and a facts-and-circumstances test is imposed instead).259 Taken by itself, this primary purpose requirement is a legislative rule. The statutory provisions, in
themselves, do not provide for facts-and-circumstances sourcing on an inventory sale where the taxpayer’s sourcing is accurate in both form and
substance (but was primarily structured for tax avoidance).260
However, under general administrative law principles, interpretive regulations exist in tax law. Often, tax regulations are analogous to the guidance at issue in American Mining, which provided a medically precise
interpretation of what constituted a diagnosis for a particular disease. Tax
regulations are often similarly circumscribed as technical interpretations of
reasonably bounded statutory concepts. Take, for instance, Treasury Regulation § 1.305-1. Section 305 is the Macomber-based261 rule that C corp. stockon-stock dividends are not generally treated as income. While other § 305
regulations may be legislative,262 § 1.305-1 is a prime example of an interpretive tax rule. It describes the scope and general operation of how the
statutory scheme for stock dividends operates;263 incorporates statutory definitions into the regulations;264 and provides an intuitive valuation scheme
256.
Id.
257.
One could have regulations under § 482 that qualify as interpretive because they
interpret existing legislative regulations under § 482, but otherwise, all § 482 regulations
would seem to be necessarily legislative.
258.
I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(6), 862(a)(6), 865(b).
259.
Treas. Reg. § 1.861-7(c).
260.
The statutory language alone could arguably support agency action against a seller
who formally conducts a sale in one location while, in substance, the sale occurred elsewhere,
but substance is separate from purpose. Also, case law has effectively defanged this primary
purpose requirement, but this case law development is irrelevant here. See A.P. Green Exp.
Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 383, 390 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
261.
See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
262.
E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.305-7.
263.
Id. § 1.305-1(a), (c).
264.
Id. § 1.305-1(d).
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for stock dividends that follows naturally from the Code.265 All this content
can be safely described as interpretive. The IRS would have more than
adequate legislative authority to assert these interpretive points absent the
regulation. One finds a similarly interpretive regulation related to the treatment of joint interests under the estate tax.266 The regulation again describes how the related statutory scheme operates,267 provides valuation
rules and a definition of joint interests that flow naturally from the statute,268 and offers some clear-cut application examples that also follow naturally from the statutory language.269

c. Against the Doctrinal Elimination of Interpretive
Regulations in Tax
Professor Hickman agrees that many tax regulations, like those under
I.R.C. § 482 and the primary purpose regulation for title passage, are legislative regardless of the statutory authority for their promulgation, because,
“many Treasury regulations . . . are sufficiently extensive to be essential to
sustain an enforcement action, confer tax benefits, or impose obligations.”270
But she goes further than that to claim that no tax regulations are currently
interpretive, not even those like Treas. Regulations §§ 1.305-1 & 20.2040-1,
which are entirely interpretive in substance.
She primarily argues that tax regulations are necessarily legislative because of the penalties associated with them. These penalties are dispositive
in making all tax regulations legislative. She also puts forward ancillary arguments related to CFR publication and the nature and judicial treatment
of general authority. Professor Hickman’s arguments are unavailing when
one: (1) conceives of interpretive tax regulations under the more circumscribed American Mining test rather than the specific/general distinction and
(2) considers those penalty provisions in relation to the antecedent legislative authority that those interpretive regulations construe. Against Professor
Hickman’s conception, this Article finds that interpretive tax regulations
exist in a reasonable middle between current exceptionalist and anti-exceptionalist thought—not pervasive, but also far from impossible.
The CFR argument is presented as the most tangential, so it can easily
be dispensed with first. As Professor Hickman writes, while CFR publication “is merely nondispositive of agency intent,” that Treasury publishes all
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. § 1.305-1(b).
I.R.C. § 2040 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(a).
Id. § 20.2040-1(a)(2), (b).
Id. § 20.2040-1(c).
Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3, at 1767.
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regulations in the CFR “further mitigates [sic] against its claim that any of
its regulations are merely interpretative.”271 The CFR publication factor is
not “merely nondispositive” or, as Professor Hickman calls it elsewhere, “a
potential additional indicator” of being legislative.272 Rather, this factor is
completely dead, as various authorities have recognized.273 The D.C. Circuit opinion that deleted the CFR requirement is worded so one could argue, as Professor Hickman does, that CFR publication has relevance, if only
to the slightest degree.274 However, as administrative law authorities have
recognized, that opinion’s soft language is best read as a rhetorically gentle
act of euthanasia, identical in substance to overruling. Thus, that Treasury
publishes all its regulations in the CFR is of no moment.
The other ancillary argument concerns the nature and judicial treatment of general legislative authority. Professor Hickman argues that “Treasury’s expressed reliance in all of its [regulatory issuances] . . . on I.R.C.
§ 7805(a)’s clear delegation of authority to promulgate regulations should be
sufficient to render them legislative, given the general understanding that
rules so promulgated are legally binding . . . .”275 In other words, all regulations issued under § 7805(a) must be legislative, because Treasury and the
courts have, historically, “generally underst[ood]” them to be “legally
binding.”276
The chief problem with this anti-exceptionalist depiction of § 7805(a) is
that it relies on historical practice under the specific/general distinction that
it separately attacks as doctrinally wrong. It is true that historically, in the
era of the specific/general distinction, courts and Treasury were sloppy in
their treatment of legislative versus interpretive tax rules, with the latter
often treated as legally binding.277 But that largely derives from the specific/general distinction itself, since that distinction at least nominally made
so much of tax rulemaking interpretive that it was hard not to treat interpretive rules as legally binding. Indeed, just such problems of the specific/
general distinction are a big part of why tax exceptionalism is coming to an
end. While we should recognize that the specific/general distinction was the
271.
Id.
272.
Hickman, Unpacking, supra note 31, at 482.
273.
E.g. Pierce, Distinguishing, supra note 229, at 560 (noting that the American Mining
factors have been “amended . . . to delete the CFR publication criterion”).
274.
Health Ins. Ass’n of Am. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (describing
CFR publication as “a snippet of evidence of agency intent”).
275.
Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3, at 1767. I address this argument separately from
the issue of penalties, although these two claims are deeply interrelated.
276.
Id.; see id. at 1773. This argument creates a curious parallel between exceptionalism
and anti-exceptionalism, which are both diametrically absolute in their characterization of
rulemaking under § 7805(a).
277.
See DAVIS, supra note 197, at § 5.03-3.
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law until recently, we should not adduce problematic historical practices
related to that distinction to justify how doctrine operates going forward.278
That leaves Professor Hickman’s penalty argument, which is her core
argument for why interpretive regulations do not currently exist in the tax
law.279 Her point can be summed up simply: all tax regulations are legislative because the IRS assesses penalties for noncompliance with all tax regulations. When noncompliance with rules is enforced through statutory
penalties, that “represents the paradigmatic example of a congressional delegation of power to act with the force of law.”280 Professor Hickman cites to
Supreme Court precedent and the Attorney General’s Manual on the APA
for the proposition that whether a regulation has the force of law is what
fundamentally separates legislative and interpretive rules.281
However, despite her absolute conclusion for all tax rulemaking, Professor Hickman notes that “the presence or absence of statutory penalties for
noncompliance is clearly not the sine qua non for concluding that agency
pronouncements carry or lack the force of law.”282 Courts sometimes find
the force of law for agency actions that lack statutory penalties. Inversely, in
United States v. Mead, the Court found that the informal tariff adjudications
at issue did not carry the force of law, despite consequences flowing from
those adjudications that are “at least analogous” to monetary penalties.283
Professor Hickman distinguishes Mead from tax rulemaking by labelling the
278.
To support her legally binding claim, Professor Hickman cites to a case that, in
summarizing the American Mining factors, describes what this Article labeled as prong one—
whether the agency labeled the regulation as interpretive—as whether the agency invoked its
“general legislative authority.” Erringer v. Thompson, 371 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2004).
She seems to indicate that this language from Erringer supports her characterization of
§ 7805(a)’s general authority as always legislative, but her citation is not at all supportive of
this claim. This Erringer language is merely providing a gloss on American Mining (and is not
announcing any law about the scope of interpretive rulemaking vis-à-vis statutory grants of
general rulemaking authority). More importantly, the Erringer court is using general authority not to refer to a statutory provision that provides for general rulemaking, but instead “the
agency’s general legislative authority, separate and apart from any particular statutory provision.” Id. at 631. In other words, Erringer—a case that broadly construes the permissible
scope of the interpretive exception, in any event—is entirely irrelevant to the treatment of
general statutory authority like § 7805(a).
279.
This “penalty elephant in the middle of the room,” as she terms it, is so central that
Professor Hickman wrote a separate article to expand it. Hickman, Unpacking, supra note 31,
at 515.
280.
Id. at 525.
281.
Id. at 475.
282.
Id. at 525. Thus, force of law is the animating concept underlying the American
Mining-type factors.
283.
See id. (citing EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR
L EGISLATION 92-94 (2008)); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). One must
either pay the assessed tariff, or the subject goods cannot enter the country.
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former “an informal adjudication with a limited coercive range.”284 The argument, although somewhat implicit, is that sanctions or penalties are a
more dispositive factor for rulemaking than adjudication, and that these
penalties in the tax context are less “limited” than the sanctions in Mead.
Before responding to this claim, it is necessary to sketch how these
penalty provisions operate for tax regulations. Among the Code’s “ ‘mindnumbing assortment’ of civil penalties,”285 § 6662(b)(1) penalizes a taxpayer
for underpayment that results from “negligence or disregard of rules or regulations,” which includes all “temporary or final Treasury regulations.”286
The penalty is 20% of the underpayment to which § 6662 applies.287 In this
context, “ ‘negligence’ includes any failure to make a reasonable attempt to
comply with the provisions of this title,” and “ ‘disregard’ includes any careless, reckless, or intentional disregard.”288
If the IRS assesses a § 6662(b)(1) penalty for noncompliance with a
regulation, a taxpayer can rebut that assessment in two ways: the more factual “reasonable cause” defense and the more legal “reasonable basis” defense.
First, the taxpayer can demonstrate that she had “reasonable cause” for her
position and that the taxpayer took that position “in good faith.”289 Reasonable cause is, in essence, a factual determination that the taxpayer tried hard
enough to be right.290 For instance, a good-faith computational error or
reliance on an erroneous W2 could both constitute reasonable cause.291 Reasonable cause is determined “case-by-case,”292 with the taxpayer’s effort
evaluated relative to her sophistication.293
A taxpayer can also rebut the penalty with the reasonable basis defense.
To qualify, if the taxpayer took a position contrary to a regulation, the taxpayer must: (1) properly disclose her position to the IRS and (2) have, as a
284.
Hickman, Unpacking, supra note 31, at 525.
285.
BITTKER & L OKKEN, supra note 151, ¶ 114.2.
286.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(2) (2015).
287.
I.R.C. § 6662(a) (2012).
288.
Id. § 6662(c); see IRM 20.1.5.7.2 (2016).
289.
I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1).
290.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (“[T]he most important factor is the extent of the
taxpayer’s effort to assess the taxpayer’s proper tax liability.”).
291.
Id.
292.
Id.
293.
Geary v. Comm’r, 235 F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 2000). Geary also demonstrates
that the legal nature of the underlying tax issue can affect the reasonable cause analysis. In
that case, the “absence of case law on point” factored into the reasonable cause finding. Id. A
“common issue” arises when a taxpayer claims reasonable cause based on “the advice of a
professional tax advisor.” Blum v. Comm’r, 737 F.3d 1303, 1317 (10th Cir. 2013); see Treas.
Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1) (as amended in 2003). Especially when the tax advisor was promoting
the transaction at issue, professional reliance is often insufficient to establish reasonable
cause. Blum, 737 F.3d at 1317-19; Curcio v. Comm’r, 689 F.3d 217, 229 (2d Cir. 2012).
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legal matter, a “reasonable basis” for the contrary position.294 Courts have
not hesitated to affirm penalties where either of those components is absent.295 In the hierarchy of tax standards, reasonable basis is more rigorous
than “not frivolous” and “not patently improper,”296 but is “less stringent
than the ‘substantial authority’ standard . . . which in turn is less stringent
than the ‘more likely than not standard.’ ”297 For what it’s worth, reasonable
basis has been roughly translated into a 20-30% likelihood of success.298
Now, let us return to Professor Hickman’s argument that these “statutory penalties for noncompliance with agency rules” imbue all tax regulations with the force of law (and thus make them legislative).299 These
details of the § 6662(b)(1) penalty generate two interrelated responses to
Professor Hickman’s argument. First, is § 6662(b)(1) really a statutory penalty for “noncompliance” in the relevant sense? And second, in the case of
rules that could otherwise be characterized as interpretive, is § 6662(b)(1)
in substance a penalty for noncompliance with those “rules”?
With regard to the first point, § 6662(b)(1) does not penalize noncompliance, in the sense that it does not penalize all taxpayers who fail to comply with a tax regulation. Instead, it penalizes something much narrower—
negligence or unreasonable disregard toward those regulations that results in
noncompliance. If the regulation at issue interprets an unsettled area of law,
or if one can concoct a half-decent argument against the regulation based on
some other legal authority (including the language of the antecedent statute),300 then § 6662(b)(1) is probably inapplicable. Section 6662(b)(1) penalizes taxpayers when, given the state of all citable legal authority, it would
be legally negligent to argue a position different than the one embodied in
the regulation. Even then, the taxpayer can still make a factual case that any
noncompliance should be excused for reasonable cause. This nuance matters
here. The particular texture of the statutory penalty or sanction at issue
should affect whether that penalty or sanction makes the related regulation
legislative.301 For § 6662(b)(1), given the provision’s more “limited coercive
294.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(a), (c)(1)-(2).
295.
E.g., Campbell v. Comm’r, 658 F.3d 1255, 1260 (11th Cir. 2011); Kovacevich v.
Comm’r, 177 F. App’x 561, No. 04-71326, 2006 WL 991878 (9th Cir. 2006).
296.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3).
297.
Matthies v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 141, 154 (2010).
298.
Robert P. Rothman, Tax Opinion Practice, 64 TAX LAW. 301, 327 (2011). For issues of
first impression that involve some statutory ambiguity or issues that are otherwise unsettled,
a finding of reasonable basis is likely. See Matthies, 134 T.C. at 154.
299.
Hickman, Unpacking, supra note 31, at 471.
300.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii).
301.
In light of the stubborn facts in Mead, this seems necessarily so. See United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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range,”302 the provision should not automatically make all tax regulations
legislative.
This first point does not mean the penalty provision has no relevance to
the legislative/interpretive distinction. Rather, this first point should be
considered in conjunction with the second point mentioned above—the extent to which § 6662(b)(1) is penalizing noncompliance with rules. To illustrate this point, consider a tax regulation that, aside from this penalty issue,
could be reasonably characterized as interpretive under American Mining. In
that case, the substance of the regulation must be reasonably tethered to the
statutory text that it interprets. If a taxpayer is penalized under
§ 6662(b)(1) for violating this regulation, then there is no other interpretation of the antecedent statute that has a reasonable basis.303 At this point,
the taxpayer is, in substance, being penalized for violating the antecedent
statute rather than the interpretive regulation. Thus, for force-of-law purposes, the penalty is effectively for statutory noncompliance, not regulatory
noncompliance. This logic does not hold for a regulation that is otherwise
legislative. As an independent act of policymaking, the validity of a legislative regulation is not tethered to the substance of the antecedent statute in
the same way.
The conclusion is thus that tax regulations can be interpretive just as
regulations can be interpretive in other fields of federal law, notwithstanding § 6662(b)(1). This understanding that tax regulations can be interpretive goes a long way to avoid destabilizing tax administration. If some
number of tax regulations can be plausibly described as interpretive, then
they are not subject to risk of mass invalidation, as they are under Professor
Hickman’s theory. This Article now turns to the other key exception to
notice and comment: the good cause exception.

2. The Good Cause Exception
This Part dissects the good cause exception just as the previous Part did
the interpretive exception. It begins with brief doctrinal background. It
then critiques Professor Hickman’s application of this doctrine and, in the
process, puts forward a vision of how good cause operates in tax.
Just as interpretive rules are exempt from § 553’s notice-and-comment
requirements, an agency can also exempt legislative rules if it has “good
cause” because notice and comment would be “impracticable, unnecessary,
302.
Hickman, Unpacking, supra note 31, at 525.
303.
Another article has gestured toward this thinking. See Jasper L. Cummings, Jr.,
Treasury Violates the APA, 117 TAX NOTES 263, 266-67 n.30 (2007).
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or contrary to the public interest.”304 Generally speaking, good cause is invoked “when agencies perceive a high degree of urgency in issuing a rule or”
see harm in giving advance notice “for a future change in rules.”305 Paradigmatic cases of urgency include a post-9/11 FAA regulation to allow the revocation of pilot certificates for foreign nationals who are deemed security
threats,306and another FAA regulation instituted to prevent Hawaiian tour
helicopter crashes after a spate of deaths.307 For potential harm from advance notice, paradigmatic cases involved price control announcements,
where prior notice of price changes threatened market disruption.308
Unsurprisingly, beyond such case-specific illustrations, what precisely
constitutes good cause is “unclear.”309 Judicial conclusions about good cause
are, by necessity, heavily fact-bound and contextual. Courts often note that
the exception “should be interpreted narrowly,”310 but one finds “inconsistency” in how exacting courts are in reviewing agency invocations of good
cause.311 Indeed, despite the rhetoric on narrow interpretation, the good
cause exception is quite commonly invoked across federal agencies.312
Again, as with the interpretive exception, Professor Hickman takes an
exceedingly narrow view of how the good cause exception applies to tax. As
with the interpretive exception, this Article argues that her intervention
goes a long way toward charting the path forward. However, again, her
304.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B), (d)(3) (2012). This Article will discuss together the good
cause exceptions for notice and comment and the 30-day publication requirement. Good
cause can be invoked separately with respect to each, but this distinction is not necessary to
this broader discussion of tax administration policy.
305.
PIERCE, supra note 82, § 7.10. Raso helpfully lists the factors that agencies commonly cite. Raso, supra note 218, at 88-89; see Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1123 (2009) (“As the Attorney General’s Manual put it,
impracticability would arise where ‘an agency finds that due and timely execution of its
functions would be impeded’ by compliance with notice-and-comment procedures.’ ”).
306.
Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
307.
Haw. Helicopter Operators Ass’n v. FAA, 51 F.3d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1995).
308.
E.g., Reeves v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455, 458-59 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974); DeRieux v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321, 1332 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974); see Riverbend
Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1485-86 (9th Cir. 1992).
309.
JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44356, THE GOOD CAUSE EXCEPTION TO NOTICE AND COMMENT RULEMAKING: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION 2 (2016), https://www.fas
.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44356.pdf.
310.
Buschmann v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 352, 357 (9th Cir. 1982); see Asimow, supra note
20, at 348 (“Numerous judicial decisions, well supported by the legislative history, establish
that the good cause provision is narrowly construed.”).
311.
Raso, supra note 218, at 88.
312.
Id. at 91-92 (“Agencies avoided the notice-and-comment process on almost 52% of
rules on which final action was taken from 1995 to 2012. . . . Good cause was the primary
exemption cited by agencies for both major and non-major rules.” (citations omitted)).
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portrayal of the APA in this context is in some ways overly narrow, and so
her proposal for what good cause means in tax should be moderated.
Professor Hickman makes two key observations about the good cause
exception, one procedural and one substantive. The procedural observation
is that the good cause exception requires, by its terms, that the agency must
expressly invoke good cause and provide a contemporaneous, reasoned explanation for why good cause exists.313 As her work shows, Treasury has not
been assiduous about this procedural requirement, to put it mildly.314 Indeed, the Tax Court in Altera declined to apply the good cause exception
because Treasury failed to follow this required procedure.315 However, even
if “courts have been inconsistent in requiring agencies to invoke the good
cause exception explicitly,”316 Professor Hickman’s procedural point is welltaken in terms of how Treasury should operate as APA-compliant tax administration is implemented.
Professor Hickman’s substantive observation is that “Treasury’s reliance
on the good cause exception is . . . often misplaced in light of jurisprudential trends.”317 She argues that Treasury’s use of good cause is “often inappropriate” as a doctrinal matter.318 While acknowledging the “fact-specific”
nature of good cause, she compares the typical Treasury rulemaking with
the two FAA rules referenced above, on post-9/11 revocation of pilot certificates and fatal helicopter crashes.319 Relatively speaking, she concludes that
the “circumstances in which Treasury issues” regulations for which Treasury
invokes (or, by her logic, is implicitly invoking) good cause “are not particu313.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B), (d)(3) (2012).
314.
Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3, at 1786 (“Treasury leaves its good cause claims
susceptible to legal challenge by not asserting the exception clearly or explaining its reasoning with specificity and particularity.”). Of course, Treasury has probably been historically
lax about this procedural requirement because it was operating under the prior assumption
(one could say, prior law) that most of its regulations were interpretive, and so it did not
need to rely on good cause in many situations where Professor Hickman now retroactively
argues that the interpretive exception is inapplicable.
315.
Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91, 117 (2015).
316.
Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3, at 1779. Importantly here, courts have been unsympathetic to systematic procedural failures on good cause invocation. See, e.g., Nader v.
Sawhill, 514 F.2d 1064, 1068 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975) (finding failure to invoke good
cause “a technical violation of normal procedures, which we do not think warrants reversal,
considering the expeditious nature of the proceedings and that good cause in fact was present. However, we warn that repeated technical noncompliance will not be tolerated.”).
317.
Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3, at 1731.
318.
Id. at 1806-07.
319.
Id. at 1783. She also offers the comparison of regulations that resolved judicial
issues with overtime pay to avoid sizable financial liabilities for state and local governments,
for which good cause was found. Id.
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larly dire.”320 Her conclusion here is not quite as categorical as with interpretive regulations; she is not saying good cause never exists in tax law.
However, her view seems to be that, even with proper procedural invocation, good cause is substantively quite rare in tax.
This Article takes issue with this substantive conclusion. First, on a
broad level, whatever the judicial rhetoric about the narrowness of good
cause, it is, in reality, invoked with some commonality.321 As a practical
matter, good cause is subject to limitation, but we should not overstate its
narrowness.
Second, and more importantly, because good cause is so inherently contextual and fact-bound, when one applies it to tax, one can (and should)
consider the particular exigencies of tax administration. In arguing against
tax exceptionalism, this Article noted that these exigencies—while not sufficient to justify tax exceptionalism—should instead factor into necessarily
contextual aspects of administrative doctrine.322 The good cause exception
is a prime vehicle for that incorporation. Given the scope of (and constraints on) the IRS’ duties as described in Part II.A, courts should maintain
a broader space for good cause in tax administration than Professor Hickman allows.323
Within this point, it is worth considering the comparison that Professor
Hickman makes between tax rulemaking and paradigmatic good-cause cases
of emergency like the Hawaii Helicopters case.324 It is important to remember that these cases are paradigmatic because they are clear-cut. They are
illustrative in their obviousness, but that should not be confused with defining the boundaries of good cause. And more than that, is tax rulemaking, as
a general matter, less exigent than rules like the one for Hawaiian helicopter
tours? The spate of chopper accidents that motivated that FAA rule is viscerally alarming,325 but of course, the FAA gets the funding to be able to
320.
Id.
321.
Contrary to that practice, the APA’s legislative history does indicate that the good
cause exception was intended to be used at least somewhat narrowly. Vermeule, supra note
305, at 1123. However, according to that same legislative history, notice and comment was
also intended to be a simple process with extremely low-touch judicial review, so it is hard to
invoke original intent on one point and not the other. See supra Part I.B.2.
322.
See supra Part II.A; Johnson, supra note 6, at 1833 (“The tradition of American
administrative law is sensitivity to context, not straitjacketing or lock-step conformity.”).
323.
See McMahon, supra note 5, at 582.
324.
Haw. Helicopter Operators Ass’n v. FAA, 51 F.3d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1995).
325.
Also, while the chopper crashes at issue were certainly serious in themselves, such
Hawaiian tours had an estimated 400,000 annual passengers prior to the FAA rule’s promulgation. Christopher Reynolds, New High-Flying Rules Have Air-Tour Pilots Feeling Low, L.A.
TIMES (Nov. 4, 1994), http://articles.latimes.com/1994-11-06/travel/tr-59189_1_air-tour-operators. When one considers data on the number of crashes relative to all that flight time, the
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promulgate such an exigent rule through the tax system. The tax system is
the prime mover in the federal firmament.326 At least to some extent, the
administrative exigencies of all other agencies are subsumed within it.
Again, this is not an argument for tax exceptionalism, but is an understanding of the factual context that necessarily informs the good cause analysis.
Treasury certainly needs to improve its procedural housekeeping on good
cause claims, per Professor Hickman’s research, but in an APA-compliant
world, the good cause exception does not need to be impossibly narrow for
tax.

3. Temporary Regulations
This Article now considers another key concept in Treasury avoidance
of APA notice and comment: so-called “temporary regulations.”327 In Professor Hickman’s empirical work, most of Treasury’s alleged violations of
the APA result from Treasury’s issuance of temporary regulations.328 Typically, at least in Treasury’s view, temporary regulations have been understood as equivalent to final regulations in terms of their legal effect. The
difference from other final regulations is that Treasury “issue[s] temporary
regulations without notice and comment, finalizing the regulations after
subsequently receiving [post-promulgation] comments,” a practice known
elsewhere in administrative law as “the ‘interim-final’ method.”329 Thus, a
temporary regulation has immediate effect, and the notice-and-comment
process occurs while the regulation is already in effect, rather than before.
Treasury has not hesitated to use temporary regulations in major regulatory
projects, including, for instance, its controversial anti-inversion
regulations.330
problem becomes much less exigent than the qualitative description implies. See Wren L.
Haaland et al., Crashes of Sightseeing Helicopter Tours in Hawaii, 80 AVIATION, SPACE, & ENVTL.
MED. 637, 640 (2009). It is quite possible that, when these rules were issued, it was riskier to
drive on an American road than to fly on a Hawaiian helicopter.
326.
Cf. Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32
VA. TAX REV. 269, 279 (2012) (“In one respect, taxation is different from and more important
than any other single federal activity. Revenue is the sine qua non for all other governmental
activities. The modern welfare and regulatory state could not exist without a robust tax
system.”).
327.
I.R.C. § 7805(e) (2012).
328.
In her study, over 88% of Treasury’s noncompliance with the APA was due to use
of temporary regulations. Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3, at 1749.
329.
James M. Puckett, Embracing the Queen of Hearts: Deference to Retroactive Tax Rules,
40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 349, 370 (2013) [hereinafter Puckett, Embracing].
330.
Inversions and Related Transactions, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,857-21,222 (Apr. 8, 2016); see
Chamber of Commerce v. IRS, No. 1:16-CV-944-LY, 2017 WL 4682050 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 6,
2017), notice of appeal filed, (5th Cir. Nov. 27, 2017); James A. Doering, New Temporary Regulations Restrain Inversions, TAXES, Oct. 2016, at 25.
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Unlike this Article’s treatments of the good cause and interpretive exceptions, this Article does not put forward a theory for how temporary regulations should be treated in APA-compliant tax administration.331 Instead,
this Article problematizes the anti-exceptionalist consensus on temporary
regulations. This Part’s argument is not that anti-exceptionalists are wrong
in their treatment of temporary regulations, but that they assume the proper
administrative treatment of temporary regulations is an easy question. In
truth, the administrative treatment of temporary regulations implicates
thorny issues of statutory interpretation.
The problem is how to square temporary regulations with the APA.
Temporary regulations, by definition, do not go through pre-promulgation
notice and comment, as required under APA § 553. Under IRC § 7805(e),
when Treasury issues a temporary regulation,332 (1) it must simultaneously
issue the regulation in proposed form, which starts the post-promulgation
notice-and-comment process and (2) the temporary regulation automatically
expires three years after its issuance.333 Broadly speaking, this problem has
two solutions. One is that, given APA § 553, temporary regulations are only
valid as an administrative law matter if they qualify for some APA-based
exception to notice and comment, chiefly either the interpretive or good
cause exceptions discussed above.334 The other solution is that Treasury has
authority, at least to some extent, to issue temporary regulations under
§ 7805(e) regardless of whether an APA-based exception applies.
Treasury has taken the latter position in litigation,335 but somewhat of a
scholarly consensus has developed that temporary regulations are invalid
unless Treasury can invoke an APA-based exception336 (and a district court
has now endorsed that view).337 The argument, which this Article will refer
to as the “§ 559 argument” for reasons that will soon become apparent, is
331.
Temporary regulations are too difficult a topic on which to provide a theory at this
time.
332.
“This rule only applies to temporary regulations issued after November 18, 1988.
Purportedly temporary regulations issued before that date remain in effect today.” BITTKER &
L OKKEN, supra note 151, ¶ 110.5 n.18.
333.
I.R.C. § 7805(e). If Treasury has not finalized that simultaneously proposed regulation, the temporary regulation automatically becomes ineffective after three years.
334.
See supra Part III.B.1-2.
335.
See sources cited infra note 356.
336.
Asimow, supra note 20, at 361-64; John F. Coverdale, Chevron’s Reduced Domain:
Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings after Mead, 55 ADMIN . L. REV. 39,
69-70 (2003); Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3, at 1736-40; Vasquez & Lowy, supra note 30, at
249-54; Eleanor D. Wood, Note, Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism: Bringing Temporary Treasury
Regulations Back in Line with the APA, 100 MINN. L. REV. 839, 840-41 (2015). As with so
much in tax administration, Professor Hickman has best articulated this position.
337.
Chamber of Commerce v. IRS, No. 1:16-CV-944-LY, 2017 WL 4682050, at *6-7
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2017), notice of appeal filed, (5th Cir. Nov. 27, 2017).
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based on straightforward statutory interpretation. APA § 559 states that the
APA’s requirements—which include, of course, notice and comment—cannot be waived by another statute unless that other statute “does so expressly.”338 IRC § 7805(e), which articulates how temporary regulations
must operate, does not “expressly” waive APA § 553’s notice-and-comment
requirements.339 Nothing in § 7805(e) or in any other Code provision, according to this argument, “expressly” waives APA § 553’s applicability to
temporary regulations.340 Thus, APA § 553 remains fully applicable to temporary regulations, and like any other regulation issued without notice and
comment, a temporary regulation is invalid unless an APA-based exception
applies.
Before Professor Hickman’s work and the modern turn away from tax
exceptionalism, the § 559 argument had much less destabilizing potential.
For instance, Professor Michael Asimow, an early proponent of the § 559
argument, also accepted the specific/general distinction for determining
whether tax regulations are interpretive.341 Under the specific/general distinction, so many tax regulations would qualify as interpretive that it would
be easy for temporary regulations to commonly qualify for that APA exception.342 Professor Asimow also only wanted to change administrative practice for temporary regulations on a go-forward basis, rather than
destabilizing the tax system by threatening the validity of all existing temporary regulations (and final regulations that have ever resulted from temporary regulations).343
In modern tax administration, the § 559 argument now has higher
stakes. Professor Hickman and, based on her work, the Tax Court344 have
rejected the specific/general distinction,345 which this Article agrees is no
longer defensible.346 More than that, Professor Hickman’s influential work
effectively eliminates the interpretive exception from tax law (and comes
close to doing the same to the good cause exception). If these exceptions are
close to nonexistent, then virtually all temporary regulations are procedur338.
5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012) (emphasis added).
339.
Chamber of Commerce, 2017 WL 4682050, at *6. Section 7805(e) merely (1) references a category of regulations known as temporary regulations and (2) requires simultaneous proposed rulemaking and that three-year sunset.
340.
Id.
341.
Asimow, supra note 20, at 357-64.
342.
However, Treasury has used temporary regulations for specific authority regulations. Coverdale, supra note 336, at 69. Those inversion regulations are one example. See
I.R.C. § 7874(c)(6), (g) (2012).
343.
Asimow, supra note 20, at 372-73.
344.
Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91, 115-17 (2015).
345.
Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3, at 1762-63.
346.
See supra Part III.B.1.b.
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ally invalid.347 Moreover, Professor Hickman theorizes that any procedural
taint on temporary regulations would also infect final regulations that are
eventually promulgated from those simultaneously issued proposed regulations,348 and she seems at least impassive at the prospect of the retroactive
“amnesty” that Professor Asimow proposes. Demonstrating the influence of
her thinking on temporary regulations, a Tax Court concurrence in 2010
wholly endorsed Professor Hickman’s view,349 and a recent district court
decision strongly reflects her thinking.350
This Article has two points to make about temporary regulations, both
of which help avoid this unnecessary destabilization of all regulations that
have ever had a temporary form. The first point has already been made: the
interpretive and good cause exceptions should not be applied as narrowly as
Professor Hickman advocates. If one adopts this Article’s view of how these
exceptions operate in tax,351 it goes a decent way toward ameliorating any
potential crisis, even if one otherwise accepts the § 559 argument.
The second point requires more explanation. The § 559 argument is
eminently reasonable; “expressly” is a plain word with a plain meaning. But
the counterargument—that temporary regulations that comply with IRC
§ 7805(e) do not, at least to a certain degree, need to comply with APA
§ 553 pre-promulgation notice and comment, even if an APA-based exception is not squarely applicable—must be addressed more seriously. This Article does not assert that the § 559 argument is wrong,352 but will argue that
the issue is at least much more complicated than § 559 argument propo347.
Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3, at 1786.
348.
Id. at 1791-95; Puckett, Embracing, supra note 329, at 370 (“Hickman also has argued
not only that a temporary regulation is invalid, but that it may taint the final regulation to
which it relates, assuming no APA exception applies, such as for “good cause” or interpretative rules.”). Treasury, unsurprisingly, disagrees. See Brief for the United States at 29-30,
United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 11-139), 2011
WL 5591822.
349.
Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 211, 245-48 (2010) (Halpern,
J. & Holmes, J., concurring), rev’d, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment
vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2120 (2012); see Wood, supra note 336, at 847-48.
350.
Chamber of Commerce v. IRS, No. 1:16-CV-944-LY, 2017 WL 4682050, at *5-7
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 2017), notice of appeal filed, (5th Cir. Nov. 27, 2017).
351.
See supra Parts II.B.2, III.B.1-2.
352.
As a result, this Article will not analyze or endorse other potential constraints on
temporary regulation authority if I.R.C. § 7805(e) is read, to some degree, as an authorization of regulatory power independent from APA § 553. For instance, instead of reviewing for
APA § 553 compliance, one could instead review Treasury’s decision to issue a temporary
regulation for abuse of discretion or compliance with the arbitrary and capricious standard
under APA § 706(2)(A). Additionally, based on this Article’s argument that I.R.C. § 7805(e)
has embedded within it exceptionalism-era assumptions about how the APA works in tax
(e.g., the specific/general distinction), one could arguably review Treasury APA compliance
for temporary regulations based on those prior assumptions.
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nents often portray it to be.353 Professor Hickman has called a variant of
this counterargument “simply implausible;”354 Professor Coverdale deemed
it “a difficult position to sustain.”355 This Article will now explain some
reasons why the counterargument should not be so easily dismissed.
First, IRC § 7805(e) arguably does not make much structural sense unless temporary regulations receive some leniency under APA § 553. Or, put
a different way, temporary regulations do not make sense as a distinct category unless that is true. Professor Hickman argues that because APA
§ 553(b) “allows Treasury to issue temporary regulations if one of [the
APA] exceptions apply, it is not necessary to read I.R.C. § 7805(e) as independent authorization for temporary regulations in order to give that provision effect.”356 To accept that argument in tandem with the rest of Professor
Hickman’s thinking, you have to believe the following: when Congress enacted IRC § 7805(e) in 1988,357 this subsection was intended to impose a
unique disability on Treasury, relative to all other federal agencies, in terms
of issuing rules without pre-promulgation notice and comment.358 For temporary regulations, not only must an APA exception apply to avoid prepromulgation notice and comment, but even then, the regulation will still
expire in three years (and proposed rulemaking must be undertaken
simultaneously).
Why would Congress always want a simultaneous proposed rulemaking
(and a three-year sunset) for a rule that otherwise qualified for one of the
353.
Part of the problem is that, in responding to the § 559 argument, the government
has put forward weak counterarguments. The government has made three core arguments:
(1) I.R.C. § 7805(e) is a specific statute that supersedes the more general APA § 553, per the
interpretive canon that the specific statute supersedes the conflicting general one, (2) that
the § 559 argument would contravene another interpretive canon by rendering I.R.C.
§ 7805(e) “meaningless,” and (3) that in any event, tax is exceptional. See Reply Brief for the
Appellant at 6-8, Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Comm’r, 647 F.3d 929 (10th Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, judgment vacated, 132 S. Ct. 2100 (2012) (No. 09-9015), 2010 WL 2397312; see Respondent’s Brief in Support of Motion To Vacate Order and Decision at 19-20, Intermountain Ins. Serv. of Vail v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 211, 211 (2010), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 132
S. Ct. 2120 (2012) (No. 25868-06), 2010 WL 2285587; Wood, supra note 336, at 858-59
n.129 (citing the foregoing). The first argument is incorrect because it wrongly assumes the
(allegedly) more specific and more general statutes are in conflict. The second argument is
incorrect because I.R.C. § 7805(e) is rendered narrow, but certainly not meaningless. The
third argument is wrong for the reasons discussed in Part II.A.
354.
Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3, at 1740 n.65.
355.
Coverdale, supra note 336, at 69.
356.
Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3, at 1739.
357.
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6232,
102 Stat. 3342, 3734-35.
358.
This proposition is a sort of anti-exceptionalist exceptionalism, for it postulates that
Treasury is special in administrative law, but in the inverse of the way that traditional exceptionalism argues.
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APA exceptions when those exceptions are, in Professor Hickman’s telling,
so narrow in the tax context? One could argue that it is difficult to believe
that the intent of Congress was to make APA compliance uniquely arduous
for Treasury, by imposing § 7805(e) on top of APA § 553(b), particularly
when the latter is interpreted as narrowly in the tax context as Professor
Hickman argues. Section 7805(e)’s independent constraints on temporary
regulations arguably make more sense if they apply to rules that are not so
aggressively constrained under APA § 553(b). Indeed, if Professor Hickman’s reading is correct, the category of temporary regulations would be a
null set, for Treasury would never issue them. Instead, if a rule qualifies for
an exception under APA § 553, a rational Treasury, attempting to avoid
unnecessary administrative burden, would just issue that rule as final, as any
other agency can. Even if Treasury wanted to engage in post-promulgation
notice and comment, it would still issue the rule as final and then take
subsequent comments. If there is no benefit to issuing regulations as temporary—i.e., leniency under APA § 553(b)—then it would arguably never
make sense to accept the burdens of § 7805(e).
A different understanding is the following. When Congress passed
§ 7805(e), APA compliance in tax administration meant something very different than it does now. Congress passed § 7805(e) in 1988359 against the
legal backdrop discussed above, in the era of the specific/general distinction.360 In that context, so much of tax rulemaking qualified for exceptions
to APA notice and comment that this § 7805(e) issue was, if not moot, at
least far less important.361 Even if § 7805(e) was additive to APA § 553,
Treasury could so commonly qualify for exceptions to pre-promulgation notice and comment that their combination was not lethal.362
Thus, when Congress used the term “temporary regulation” in
§ 7805(e), embedded in that term was an understanding of tax administration as it existed at passage in 1988. On a certain level, that conclusion is
epistemologically obvious, for how could the 100th Congress of that year
have an understanding of tax administration other than the predominant
understanding at that time? But even putting that point aside, it is hard to
avoid this conclusion that § 7805(e) has embedded within it a twentiethcentury understanding of tax administration, both in looking at the legisla-

359.
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, § 6232.
360.
See supra Part II.B.1.
361.
See Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91, 115-17 (2015); Hickman, Coloring, supra
note 3.
362.
As discussed above, one sees this understanding in Professor Asimow’s article,
which was published shortly after § 7805(e) was passed.
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tive history363 and in rationalizing temporary regulations as a logically coherent category. To refine the issue somewhat, the problem is not whether
§ 7805(e) does or does not “expressly” abrogate APA § 553,364 but whether
§ 7805(e) has embedded within it a particular understanding of what it
means for Treasury to comply with APA § 553.
Thus, if we interpret statutory terms based on their originally intended
meaning,365 this statutory codification of the term “temporary regulation”
imported contemporaneous tax administration assumptions into the Code.
The problem is that § 7805(e)’s structural logic has these embedded assumptions, but now these assumptions are losing their validity. This problem is not a simple one. It is a wrenching conundrum of statutory
interpretation. When passed, the statutory terms had certain meanings and
(logically necessary) embedded assumptions, but the ground beneath those
meanings and assumptions has shifted substantially as time has passed.
Contending with this interpretive challenge occupies some of the greatest
minds in the law.366 Thus, proponents of the § 559 argument should not so
easily dismiss this counterargument.
The § 559 argument also has a second major problem: its broader implications arguably threaten to destabilize tax administration beyond just temporary regulations. The basic issue is that, if one accepts the § 559
argument’s view of I.R.C. § 7805(e), then one must, inescapably, take the
same view of how another subsection of I.R.C. § 7805—§ 7805(b)—relates
to the APA. Under this logically necessary view of § 7805(b), Treasury almost entirely loses the power to make regulations retroactively effective.367
As a result, Treasury loses an arguably important regulatory tool.
363.
In describing § 7805(e), the brief legislative history makes no mention of the interrelation with the APA. Thus, it seems logical to conclude that Congress accepted that interrelation as it existed at the time in contemporary law. See S. REP . NO. 100-309, at 7
(1988); H.R. REP . NO. 100-1104, at 217-18 (1988) (Conf. Rep.).
364.
5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012).
365.
See NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:5
(7th ed. 2016) (“To interpret statutes, intent of the legislature is by far the most common
such criterion.” (internal citation omitted)). Cf. KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41637, SELECTED THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 8 (2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R41637.pdf (“This doctrine of objective ‘original meaning’ emphasizes how the text of
the Constitution would have been understood by a reasonable person in the historical period
during which the Constitution was proposed, ratified, and first implemented.”).
366.
E.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
1479 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405 (1989).
367.
Professor Puckett expresses concern that anti-exceptionalists could apply the § 559
argument to I.R.C. § 7805(b). Puckett, supra note 5, at 1099-1100. I think he is much too
modest. One must extend the § 559 argument in this manner. Professor Puckett makes a
glancing, footnoted argument to the contrary. Id. at 1100 n.197. However, his claim that

R
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Section 7805(b) provides limits on Treasury’s ability to make regulations retroactively effective. Section 7805(b)(1) forbids Treasury from making any regulation effective “before the earliest of the following dates”: (1)
the first date on which the regulation is filed with the Federal Register in
any form (i.e., a final regulation can be effective as of the date it was filed in
proposed or temporary form) and (2) the date that Treasury publishes a
notice “substantially describing the expected contents” of the regulation.368
In certain specified circumstances, § 7805(b) loosens those outer limits on
retroactivity. Most notably, Treasury is not precluded from making regulations retroactive as of an earlier date than permitted under § 7805(b)(1) “to
prevent abuse.”369
American law is generally suspicious of retroactivity.370 However, retroactivity has a role in the tax law. Treasury is often the cat—and an underfunded and outmatched one at that—in the cat-and-mouse games of tax
shelters. And even when abusive transactions are not at issue, if Treasury is
changing the tax law through a regulatory project, its policy goals can arguably be thwarted if taxpayers alter transactions in the time between when
Treasury announces the project and when it finalizes the resulting regulations.371 Hence, Treasury often believes that it needs to make regulations
retroactive to the date of an initial notice.
The problem is that the § 559 argument necessarily applies to § 7805(b)
as much as it applies to § 7805(e). The essence of the § 559 argument is that
nothing in § 7805(e) “expressly” abrogates the simultaneous application of
APA § 553. Looking at the language of § 7805(b), one cannot help but
reach the same conclusion. Just like § 7805(e) with temporary regulations,
the plain language of § 7805(b) does not independently authorize retroactive regulations. Rather, § 7805(b)’s language merely imposes limits on any
retroactivity that may arise. The plain language certainly does not preclude
other limits on retroactivity outside of § 7805(b). Indeed, the phrasing of
§ 7805(b) as an outer limit on retroactivity seems to invite those other limits. Enter the APA. Under APA § 553(d), a rule cannot be effective “less
than 30 days” before its publication, unless exceptions apply like those for
§ 7805(b) would be rendered meaningless is incorrect. Section 7805(b) would be narrow, but
not meaningless. That result exactly parallels the result with § 7805(e).
368.
I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1) (2012).
369.
Id. § 7805(b)(3).
370.
E.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208-09 (1988).
371.
One can always question the wisdom of Treasury’s various rulemaking projects, but
that question is separate from whether Treasury has the administrative tools to accomplish
its goals, whatever they may be. What’s more, putting aside policy goals, it is sometimes
disruptive and potentially quite inefficient to induce a transaction rush before rule
promulgation.
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interpretive rules/good cause.372 If we accept Professor Hickman’s interpretation of those § 553 exceptions, they are close to nonexistent. Thus, if we
follow the § 559 argument and apply IRC § 7805(b) in tandem with APA
§ 553(d), Treasury’s authority to issue regulations with some retroactive effect is, in essence, completely eliminated.
The anti-exceptionalist school applies the § 559 argument to § 7805(e)
but, at least for the moment, not to § 7805(b).373 Professor Puckett, trying
to limit the reach of anti-exceptionalists, has (briefly) made a similar argument.374 These attempts to apply APA § 559 to one subsection of I.R.C.
§ 7805 and not the other are unavailing. To distinguish between I.R.C.
§ 7805(b) & (e), Professor Hickman argues that “the potential for retroactive application [under § 7805(b)] is not necessarily inconsistent with the
general rule of a delayed effective date” under APA § 553(d).375 The logic
seems to be that a retroactive rule may only become retroactively effective
thirty days after it has been published, thereby formally complying with
APA § 553(d). This argument is unconvincing. Professor Hickman seems to
concede as much when she states that this view would render APA § 553(d)
“superfluous.”376 Moreover, the two following actions are, substantively,
“functionally equivalent”377: (1) promulgating a temporary regulation that is
immediately effective on Date X and (2) publishing a proposed regulation
on Date X that will become retroactively effective back to Date X (as of
future Date Y that the regulation is finalized). In the second scenario, between Dates X and Y, a taxpayer would be forced to comply with the proposed regulation as if it had the same force as a temporary regulation, for
the taxpayer knows about the coming retroactivity. One may prefer the potential for pre-promulgation notice and comment in scenario two, but that
difference does not change the substantive result between Dates X and Y,

372.
5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (2012). Under APA § 553(d)(1), a rule that otherwise does not
qualify for an exception can have an earlier effective date if it “grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a restriction.” That could alleviate this I.R.C. § 7805(b) problem to a
minimal degree, but the real retroactivity issue is for rules that constrain taxpayers rather
than relieve them.
373.
Professor Hickman leaves open the door to applying the § 559 argument in the
future. Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3, at 1738 (arguing certain amendments to I.R.C.
§ 7805(b) “may support a narrower interpretation of” that subsection).
374.
See supra note 367 and accompanying text.
375.
Hickman, Coloring, supra note 3, at 1738.
376.
Id.
377.
Jonathan Olsen, Note, The Unique Case of Treasury Regulations Issued To Prevent
Abuse, 4 COLUM. J. OF TAX L. 174, 180 (2013).
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which is taxpayer compliance with the proposed regulation as if it had the
force of law.378
As promised, this Part has not provided a solution to the problems that
it illustrates. For the reasons just discussed, temporary regulations will be a
particularly acute sticking point in the transition to APA-compliant tax administration. As the revolution marches on, further scholarly analysis will
be necessary to address the problem of temporary regulations.

C. Reason-Giving in the Tax Rulemaking
All of the issues discussed in Part III.B involve the threshold question
of when, in promulgating rules, Treasury must undergo pre-promulgation
notice and comment under APA § 553. This Part considers what must happen when pre-promulgation notice and comment occurs. More specifically,
it examines what types of reason-giving should be sufficient for Treasury
when it engages in § 553 notice and comment. When exceptionalists decry
APA-compliant tax administration, they often invoke the bugaboo of onerous reason-giving requirements under the APA.379 They argue that forcing
this reason-giving on Treasury before it can issue rules will greatly delay
rulemaking, if not grind it to a halt. This Part argues that, in some circumstances, APA-compliant reason-giving need not be overly onerous in the tax
law. Some technical or expansive Treasury rules require fairly exacting notice-and-comment processes, but in general, these are regulations, like the
recent regulations under § 385,380 that require an exhaustive, reasoned backand-forth with affected parties as an existing matter of good policymaking,
in addition to what the APA requires. Thus, even if Treasury increases its
use of pre-promulgation notice and comment in an APA-compliant world,
that notice and comment need not (and should not) be particularly onerous
in some circumstances.381
This Article has already reviewed the APA’s reason-giving requirements
in Part I.A. To briefly restate what was discussed above, agencies must pro378.
Professor Asimow recognized this functional equivalence. Because he is so troubled
by temporary regulations untethered from APA § 553, he expects functionally equivalent
retroactivity to be restrained in the same way (and so effectively concedes the § 559 argument must apply to both § 7805(b) & (e)). See Asimow, supra note 20, at 350 n.37.
379.
E.g., McMahon, supra note 5, at 578-80; Pierce, Which Institution, supra note 110, at
3-5.
380.
See Alison Bennett, Courts Likely to OK Debt-Equity Rules: IRS Attorney, Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA), (Oct. 31, 2016).
381.
The scope of reason-giving requirements is relevant regardless of whether pre-promulgation notice and comment is required. Indeed, reason-giving is relevant to all forms of
agency action. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 6. Thus, this discussion, while limited to
rulemaking, is relevant to broader questions of IRS reason-giving.
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vide contemporaneous and legally cognizable reasons for their actions.
These reasons must provide “a satisfactory explanation for [the] . . . action[s] including a rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made.”382 In judicial review of this reason-giving, “there is no
formula for how much explanation is enough,” and “[t]he sufficiency of the
explanation depends on the circumstances.”383
What worries the remaining exceptionalists is what adequate reasongiving has come to mean in non-tax contexts.384 For a given rule, it can
often take “many years and tens of thousands of person hours to complete”
the rulemaking.385 Professor Pierce provides the “illustrative” example of
“[t]he process through which EPA issued new ozone and particulate standards in 1997.”386 For these pollution standards, the EPA had to interpret
data from “one hundred-plus studies” to argue the new standards were necessary, and the agency received over 100,000 comments on its proposed
rules.387 In all, the reason-giving for the rules required “several thousand
pages.”388 It would indeed destabilize tax administration if such lengthy
explanations were required before each rule is promulgated.
However, commentators should recognize that what constitutes necessary reason-giving is contextual, and in the tax context, as little as a few
sentences can sometimes be sufficient to satisfy the APA’s reason-giving
requirements. While the answer will vary with every rule, reason-giving in
tax should normally not require the effort in that EPA example. This is not
because tax is special, but because Treasury and the EPA are different. EPA
rules involve “scientific and technical needs” that are often entirely absent
from tax rulemaking.389 While complicated economic issues may bear on
major tax rulemaking projects, such economic questions are somewhat less
pervasive in the nitty-gritty of tax regulation than the “extremely complex
scientific and economic issues in the midst of daunting uncertainties” involved in environmental rulemaking.390
382.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
383.
Johnson, supra note 6, at 1786.
384.
E.g., McMahon, supra note 5, at 578-80; Pierce, Which Institution, supra note 110, at
3-5.
385.
Pierce, Distinguishing, supra note 229, at 551.
386.
Id. at 550.
387.
Id. at 550-51.
388.
Id. at 551; see Pierce, Deossify, supra note 109, at 65 (“Even after an agency has
devoted many years and vast resources to a single rulemaking, it confronts a 50 percent risk
that a reviewing court will hold the resulting rule invalid.”).
389.
McGarity, supra note 178, at 1398.
390.
Id.
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Often, as Professor McMahon has documented, tax rules embody
“heuristics” that provide administrable frameworks for taxpayers and the
IRS.391 Rather than intense economic reasoning, such heuristic rules often
reflect two sets of principles. The first is that, in terms of providing regulatory guidance, making a choice is often, within reasonable bounds, more
important than the choice made. Taxpayers need an answer more than they
need the answer, and that principle often drives the actual reasoning behind
rules. Second, while rules should not be economically irrational, an overriding concern for tax regulations—given the pervasive, “retail” reach of the tax
law—is not economic exactitude based in intensive empirical research, but a
rough balance of administrability and fairness (with concerns about abuse
embedded in both of those concepts).392
In terms of their underlying reasoning in any particular context, these
principles can generally be explained pithily, with reason-giving that is orders-of-magnitude less dense than the EPA example. During his tenure,
then-IRS Chief Counsel William Wilkins gestured toward this reality.
While his nomenclature was a bit different, he tried to distinguish between
major tax rules that require lengthy and technically rigorous reason-giving
and the raft of other rules that are more in the heuristic category (and for
which reason-giving need not be as onerous).393 This view of reason-giving
in tax is reasonable; it should be cognizably valid under the APA.394 It is
true that “[c]ourts tend to frame” State Farm review “in expert and datadriven terms.”395 But this is a tendency, not the law. This heuristic reasoning, as one could call it, very much represents an expert judgment about the
optimal approach to promulgating some tax rules. One can conceive of this
heuristic reasoning in tax as situations where, because of the two principles
described in the previous paragraph, the costs of producing lengthy, heavily
empirical (and potentially infeasible)396 economic reasoning in a given
Treasury rulemaking outweigh the benefits.
A recent Federal Circuit case—Balestra v. United States397—aptly illustrates this point about reason-giving for some tax rules. Balestra concerned
391.
McMahon, supra note 5, at 603.
392.
Cf. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 586 (1933) (Cardozo, J., dissenting
in part) (“Systems of taxation are not framed, nor is it possible to frame them, with perfect
distribution of benefit and burden. Their authors must be satisfied with a rough and ready
form of justice.”).
393.
Andrew Velarde, Reg Process Could Get Slower and Less Stable, Wilkins Warns, 152 TAX
NOTES 33, 33-34 (2016).
394.
But see McMahon, supra note 5, at 610 (“There is a risk the nation is moving away
from heuristics in tax with . . . the move to increased APA procedures.”).
395.
Puckett, supra note 5, at 1093.
396.
See infra pp. 80-81.
397.
Balestra v. United States, 803 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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the imposition of Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”) taxes on
deferred compensation from nonqualified deferred compensation plans.
Normally, FICA taxes are due on wages when those wages are “actually or
constructively paid,”398 but for deferred compensation from nonqualified
plans, Congress specified a “special timing rule” for when FICA taxes are
imposed.399 Under this special rule, FICA taxes are imposed at “the later of
. . . (i) when the services are performed, or (ii) when there is no substantial
risk of forfeiture of the rights to such amount.”400 The problem is that
FICA taxes are thus imposed before the employee actually receives the compensation. As a result, to determine the tax base for those FICA taxes when
due, the taxpayer needs to calculate the “present value” of that deferred
compensation.401 Treasury promulgated regulations to provide a framework
for that calculation of the “present value” of the “amount deferred.”402 Treasury dictated that, in calculating present value, taxpayers cannot discount
value based on the creditworthiness (or lack thereof) of the employer.403
This valuation rule creates the possibility, which the taxpayers in Balestra
actually faced, that FICA taxes could be due on deferred compensation that
ends up never being paid because the employer goes bankrupt before actual
payment.404 The Balestras sued for a refund, arguing the regulation was
substantively contrary to the statute and procedurally invalid under State
Farm.
For this Article, Balestra is important for the taxpayer’s State Farm
claim.405 When Treasury subjected the (lengthy) underlying regulation to
notice and comment, it did not provide reams of reason-giving. Between its
notices of proposed and final rulemaking, Treasury provided a few pages of
explanation, which mainly consisted of descriptions of the rule.406 On this
prohibition (“the prohibition”) on factoring employer creditworthiness into
present value, Treasury provided just a couple sentences of somewhat relevant reason-giving. Given the potential for “difficult valuations of future
398.
Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(a)-2(a) (as amended in 2006).
399.
Balestra, 803 F.3d at 1366.
400.
Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 3121(v)(2)(A) (2012)).
401.
Id. at 1366-67.
402.
Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)-1(c)(2)(ii).
403.
Id. (“[T]he present value cannot be discounted for the probability that payments
will not be made (or will be reduced) because of . . . the risk that the employer, the trustee,
or another party will be unwilling or unable to pay . . . .”).
404.
Balestra, 803 F.3d at 1367.
405.
The substantive claim was destined to fail, as it did, under Chevron.
406.
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) Taxation of Amounts Under Employee Benefit Plans: Final Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 4,542, 4,542-46 (Jan. 29, 1999); Taxation of Amounts Under Employee Benefit Plans: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 61 Fed.
Reg. 2,194, 2,194-98 (Jan. 25, 1996).
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benefits,” Treasury explained that it built valuation rules “to be workable, to
minimize complexity, and to provide appropriate flexibility for taxpayers.”407 Elsewhere, Treasury indicated, although it did not explicitly state,
that the prohibition helps to simplify the regulations.408
The Federal Circuit found this reason-giving to be sufficient under
State Farm,409 and the court was right to do so in this context. The court
recognized that Treasury’s goals were a balance of fairness and administrability.410 In areas where taxpayer discretion could be reasonably monitored, Treasury gave taxpayers flexibility in their present value
calculations.411 However, Treasury understandably decided that permitting
taxpayers to factor in employer creditworthiness would be unworkable. Because each employer’s financial situation is unique and byzantine, Treasury
would not be able to audit or to effectively prevent abuse. If Treasury
makes this type of judgment call, then reason-giving that evinces that judgment call should be sufficient for State Farm purposes in some tax rulemaking contexts.
One can contrast Balestra’s reasoning with that of another Federal Circuit case, Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United States,412 which is mentioned
above in Part I.A. This Article will not delve as deeply into the Dominion
facts, but the Dominion court invalidated a tax regulation for non-compliance with State Farm.413 Even if that conclusion was correct, the opinion
misconceives of State Farm in tax rulemaking because it fails to ever allow
for heuristic-based reason-giving like the Balestra court did.414 Notably, the
concurrence in Dominion notes this flaw in the majority’s reasoning.415 The
concurrence wants Treasury to at least briefly explain its heuristic reasoning
for the regulation (which it failed to do in notice and comment), but the
407.
Taxation of Amounts Under Employee Benefit Plans: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 61 Fed. Reg. at 2,195.
408.
Taxation of Amounts Under Employee Benefit Plans: Final Regulations, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 4,544-45.
409.
See Balestra, 803 F.3d at 1373.
410.
See id. at 1374 (“Treasury explained that it sought simple, workable, and flexible
rules when valuing future benefits. It devised a regulation that satisfied these goals while
comporting with the governing statute.”).
411.
See Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(v)(2)-1(c)(2)(ii) (2016). For instance, taxpayers are given
flexibility to calculate their own reasonable discount rates based on their view of the interest
rate environment and mortality risk. These accounting judgments are not narrowly contextual like the creditworthiness of an individual company.
412.
Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
413.
Id. at 1319. For good measure, the court also found the regulation substantively
invalid. Id. at 1317.
414.
Id. at 1317-18.
415.
Id. at 1321 (Clevenger, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result).
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concurrence is potentially willing to accept some rules based on such heuristic reasoning.
One final point on tax reason-giving. This divide between heuristic
rules and those tax rules that require more exhaustive reason-giving is not
obvious. Courts should be thoughtful in policing this divide. Because the
tax law often regulates transactions with or between private parties, it can
be difficult to assess, in an empirically rigorous way, whether a Treasury
regulation reflects “market practice” for a given transaction (when market
practice is relevant to the shape of the regulation). Treasury may need to be
empirically rigorous in its reason-giving for such situations, but sometimes
such empirical rigor may or may not be feasible. As currently interpreted,
the State Farm standard contemplates situations like this.416
The Altera opinion’s reasoning illustrates this issue.417 The Tax Court
found that the regulation failed State Farm because it decided “an empirical
question” about how (often private) parties structure certain private costsharing transactions.418 Incorporating this type of market intelligence about
arm’s-length transactions into regulations, when arm’s-length practice is relevant under the statute, sounds reasonable. This seems like an occasion for
more empirical reason-giving by Treasury. However, even if that is the case,
the Tax Court failed to at least consider the feasibility of its empirical demands.419 The Tax Court very well may have been right in its conclusion,
but feasibility should have been more prominent in its reasoning. Elsewhere
in the tax law, the Tax Court has effectively recognized that arm’s-length
practice sometimes needs to be intuited rather than empirically proven,
given the practical difficulty of the latter when the market involves private
parties in private transactions. Specifically, the Tax Court has conceded this
point in the estate tax valuation rules of Chapter 14.420 Projects like the
rulemaking under § 385 certainly require exhaustive reason-giving and technical rigor, but courts should be thoughtful when they assert such empiricism as an absolute requirement. They may inadvertently preclude tax
rulemaking if they do so incorrectly.
416.
Cf. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 519 (2009) (“There are
some propositions for which scant empirical evidence can be marshaled, and the harmful
effect of broadcast profanity on children is one of them.”).
417.
See Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91 (2015).
418.
Id. at 118-19.
419.
See Brief of Anne Alstott et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant at 21-22,
Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (Nos. 16-70496, 16-70497).
420.
David Berke, Family Values: An Evaluation of Internal Revenue Code Sections 2703 and
2704(b), 41 ACTEC L.J. 197, 214-15 (2015) (describing how, in the wealth transfer tax context, the Tax Court moved away from requiring direct, empirical market data to satisfy the
arm’s length standard of § 2703(b)(3)).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has covered a lot of ground: background concepts and developments in tax and administrative law in Part I; a rebuke of tax exceptionalism (with an appreciation for its historical importance) in Part II; and
critiques of anti-exceptionalist theories of tax rulemaking (and proposed alternative theories of APA compliance) in Part III. Throughout, this Article
has attempted to chart a middle course between remaining exceptionalists
and prevailing theories and interpretations embedded in current anti-exceptionalist scholarship and judicial opinions. Its aim is to advocate APA-compliant tax rulemaking that does not unnecessarily destabilize existing tax
law. This Article’s theoretical arguments could be expanded to apply to
other issues in tax administration outside of the particular rulemaking issues
that it addresses.
In the end, this Article’s breadth only illustrates how much remains
unsettled in the administrative law of tax rulemaking. Indeed, even more
remains unsettled in tax administration more broadly. While exceptionalism
is moribund, the future of tax administration involves more open questions
than settled answers. The revolution is closer to its beginning than its end.

